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Zusammenfassung 
Diese Studie bewertet den Hintergrund und die Entwicklung des gesetzlichen Mindest-
lohns in Großbritannien und die Belege für seine Wirkungen. Das vorausgegangene 
System der Entlohnungsbeiräte, 1993 im Rahmen der Deregulierungspolitik der konser-
vativen Regierung abgeschafft, wird kurz skizziert. Es wird dann erklärt, wie sich die 
Bewegung für einen gesetzlichen Mindestlohn entwickelte und Unterstützung bei den 
Gewerkschaften und der Labour Party fand. Die Debatten über die zu erwartenden Wir-
kungen eines Mindestlohns und das Für und Wider seiner Einführungen werden analy-
siert. Die Studie beschreibt dann die 1998 eingeführte Gesetzgebung zum Mindestlohn 
und ihren Stellenwert in der Strategie der Regierung von „New Labour“ zur Verbesse-
rung der Arbeitsanreize. Sie fasst die Berichte der unabhängigen Niedriglohn-
Kommission zusammen, die in Ansehung der wirtschaftlichen Lage und nach Beratung 
mit den betroffenen gesellschaftlichen Gruppen Empfehlungen an die Regierung über 
die Höhe und den Geltungsbereich des Mindestlohns erarbeitet. Die Studie fasst auch 
die verfügbaren Daten zum Einfluss der Mindestlohngesetzgebung auf Verdienste, 
Lohnunterschiede, Beschäftigungsniveaus und Armut zusammen. Sie erklärt außerdem, 
wie der Mindestlohn durchgesetzt wird, und geht auf verwandte Probleme bezüglich der 
Position von Geringverdienenden ein, deren Lohn geringer ist als der Mindestlohn. 
Schließlich erläutert sie die aktuelle Debatte über die künftige Höhe und Durchsetzung 
des Mindestlohns. 
Abstract 
This study assesses the context and development of the British NMW and the evidence 
of its impact. The study outlines the earlier system of Wages Councils, abolished in 
1993 as part of the British Conservative Government’s policy that, from the early 
1980s, had deregulated much of the British labour market. It explains how the campaign 
for a National Minimum Wage developed and attracted support from the trade union 
movement and Labour Party. It details the debate that took place in Britain about the 
impact of a minimum wage and the arguments for and against its implementation. It 
then describes the NMW legislation that was introduced in 1998 and the role the mini-
mum wage plays in the New Labour Government’s ‘make work pay’ strategy. It re-
views the reports produced by the independent Low Pay Commission that makes rec-
ommendations to Government about the rate and coverage of the minimum wage in 
light of prevailing economic circumstances and the representations of interested groups. 
This study also outlines the impact of the NMW on earnings, wage differentials, em-
ployment levels and poverty. It further explains how the NMW is enforced and consi-
ders related issues concerning the position of low paid workers earning less than the 
minimum wage. Finally it explains about a continuing debate on the rate at which the 
NMW should be set and enforced. 

The National Minimum Wage in the United Kingdom 5
Table of Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................ 9 
1 History of Minimum Wage Legislation in Britain: the Wages 
Councils................................................................................................. 11 
1.1 Conservative governments and the abolition of the fair wages resolution 
and wages Councils............................................................................................. 13 
2 The Campaign for a National Minimum Wage .................................. 16 
3 The Conservative Government’s Strategy and Opposition to a 
NMW 19 
3.1 The research evidence about the employment impacts of a NMW and the 
influence on the Labour Government’s policy.................................................. 20 
3.2 The National Minimum Wage and the Low Pay Commission ......................... 22 
3.2.1 Making work pay: from family credit to tax credits................................... 23 
3.3 The first report of the Low Pay Commission .................................................... 26 
3.4 Low Pay Commission: first report recommendations ...................................... 27 
3.5 The National Minimum Wage ............................................................................ 28 
3.6 Subsequent reports from the Low Pay Commission and changes to the 
NMW..................................................................................................................... 30 
4 The Impact of the National Minimum Wage on Low Pay, 
Productivity and Employment............................................................. 34 
4.1 Statistical analysis in all the LPC reports ........................................................... 35 
4.2 The impact of NMW on employment levels, inflation and productivity........ 36 
4.3 The NMW and ‘making work pay’ ..................................................................... 38 
5 The Enforcement of the National Minimum Wage............................ 39 
5.1 Legal contractual right to the NMW.................................................................. 40 
5.2 Enforcement actions ........................................................................................... 42 
6 Future Developments in the NMW ..................................................... 46 
Conclusion................................................................................................... 48 
References ...................................................................................................  
Appendix A: Findings from recent Low Pay Commission Research 
Projects ................................................................................................. 52 
 
Dan Finn 6
List of Tables 
Table 1:  National Minimum Hourly Wage Rates in Britain: 1999 to 
2006 (in Sterling and Euros at May 2005 exchange rate of 
£1 = €1.47).......................................................................... 9 
Table 2:  Employer Organisations in the UK......................................... 14 
Table 3:  The Case For and Against the National Minimum Wage....... 22 
Table 4:  Main Characteristics of Family Credit and Working Families 
Tax Credit 1998 / 99............................................................. 24 
Table 5: Employment Tribunals and Dispute Conciliation in the UK..... 29 
Table 6:  Main developments in the NMW after implementation in 
1999.................................................................................... 33 
Table 7:  Jobs Paid below the national minimum wage held by those 
aged 18 or over.................................................................... 39 
Table 8:  Unfair Dismissal in the UK..................................................... 42 
Table 9:  National Minimum Wage Inland Revenue Enforcement 
Action and Arrears Recovered 1999-2003............................. 44 
 
List of Abbreviations 
ASHE  Annual Survey of Hours and Earning 
BCC  British Chamber of Commerce 
CBI   Confederation of British Industry 
CPAG  Child Poverty Action Group 
CSJ   Commission of Social Justice 
DTI   Development of Trade and Industry 
EU   European Union 
ILO   International Labour Organisation 
IoD   Institute of Directors 
IR   Inland Revenue 
LPC  Low Pay Commission 
LPU  Low Pay Unit 
LFS   Labour Force Survey 
LPN  Low Pay Network 
LP   Labour Party 
NMW  National Minimum Wage 
The National Minimum Wage in the United Kingdom 7
NES  New Earning Survey 
NPI   New Policy Institute 
ONS  Officers for National Statistics 
TUC  Trade Union Congress 
TUPE  Transition of Undertakings Protection of Employment 
T & GWU Transport & General Workers Union 
TIGER Tailored Interactive Guidance on Employment Rights 
USDAW Union of Shops Distribution and Allied Workers 
WFTC  Working Families Tax Credit 
WTC  Working Tax Credit 
 

The National Minimum Wage in the United Kingdom 9
Introduction 
In 1997 the New Labour Government was elected with a pledge to introduce a National 
Minimum Wage (NMW). Its key purpose has been to provide “an effective labour mar-
ket floor that protects workers from exploitative pay levels and businesses from unfair 
competition” (LPC3, vol 1).  
The NMW first was implemented in April 1999 and since has been increased five times. 
From October 2004 it has been £4.85 (€7.13) per hour for adults and £4.10 (€6.02) for 
young people aged between 18 and 21 years and for ‘trainees’ (see Table 1). At that 
time a NMW of £3 (€4.41) per hour was introduced for 16 and 17 years olds who previ-
ously were excluded from coverage. The Government has announced that the minimum 
rates will be increased to £5.05 (€7.42) for adults and £4.25 (€6.25) for 18 to 21 year 
olds from October 2005; and to £5.35 (€7.86) and £4.85 (€6.54) respectively in October 
2006. The rate for 16 and 17 year olds will be subject to review in February 2006. 
Table 1:  National Minimum Hourly Wage Rates in Britain: 1999 to 
2006 (in Sterling and Euros at May 2005 exchange rate of £1 
= €1.47)1 
 
With effect from 
Adult worker aged 
over 25 years 
Worker aged 18 to 21, 
and ‘Development Rate’* 
for adults 
 Worker aged 16 
or 17  
1 April 1999 £3.60   €5.29 £3.00   €4.41 none 
1 October 2000 £3.70   €5.44 £3.20   €4.70 none 
1 October 2001 £4.10   €6.02 £3.50   €5.15 none 
1 October 2002 £4.20   €6.17 £3.60   €5.29 none 
1 October 2003 £4.50   €6.62 £3.80   €5.59 none 
1 October 2004 £4.85   €7.13 £4.10   €6.02 £3.00   €4.41 
1 October 2005 £5.05   €7.42 £4.25   €6.25 £3.00   €4.41 
1 October 2006 £5.35   €7.86 £4.45   €6.54 £3.00   €4.41  
• The development rate can apply to workers aged 22 and over during their first six months in a new 
job with a new employer if they are receiving ‘accredited training’ approved by UK 
Government. In April 1999 the development rate for those aged over 22 was £3.20 (€4.70). 
Increases in the NMW are not automatic. The Government has appointed an independ-
ent Low Pay Commission (LPC) that carries out regular reviews of the impact of the 
NMW on employment, productivity and earnings and makes a recommendation to the 
Government about any future increase. The LPC estimates how many low paid workers 
are likely to benefit from each increase. In a context of sustained employment growth, 
                                                 
1  There is a maximum ‘Accommodation Offset’ (for accommodation provided by an employer) that, 
from October 2004, has been set at £3.75 (€5.51) per day. This will be increased to £3.90 (€5.73) 
and £4.15 (€6.10) per day respectively in October 2005 and October 2006. 
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even in low paid sectors, and no other evidence of adverse economic effects, the Gov-
ernment has increased the NMW faster than average earnings since 2003. The October 
2004 increase benefited more than 1.1 million low paid workers, with many more esti-
mated to have received an anticipatory wage increase before April of that year 
(LPC5 2005: 15). 
In 2003 the LPC concluded that, within four years, the NMW had “become an accepted 
part of our working life and has largely ceased to be controversial” (LPC4 2003: vii).  
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1 History of Minimum Wage Legislation in Britain: the Wages 
Councils  
Minimum wage legislation in Britain can be traced to the ‘Fair Wages Resolution’ of 
1891 and the Trade Boards Act of 1909. The former required employers engaged on 
government contracts to pay at least the wage level generally recognised by the sector or 
locality concerned. This ‘Resolution’ applied throughout Britain, to all levels of Go-
vernment, and was designed to prevent subcontractors competing for public sector 
contracts by paying less than the rates set through collective or local wage agreements. 
Trade Boards were established to regulate the pay in industries notorious for the 
employment of cheap labour. In his often-quoted speech proposing the legislation, 
Winston Churchill, then President of the Board of Trade explained that the Boards were 
necessary to ensure that workers received a living wage in industries where the bargain-
ing strength of employers greatly outweighed that of employees (House of Commons 
Debate 28 April 1909: col. 388). 
Where in the great staple trades in the country you have a powerful organisation 
on both sides, where you have responsible leaders able to bind their constituents 
to their decision, where that organisation is conjoint with an automatic scale of 
wages or arrangements for avoiding a deadlock by means of arbitration, there 
you have a healthy bargaining which increases the competitive power of the in-
dustry, enforces a progressive standard of life and the productive scale, and con-
tinually weaves capital and labour more closely together. But where you have 
what we call sweated trades, you have no organisation, no parity of bargaining, 
the good employer is undercut by the bad, and the bad employer is undercut by 
the worst. 
The Government encouraged the formation of voluntary Joint Industrial Councils in 
employment sectors that already had effective collective bargaining and the Trade 
Boards were intended to provide ‘surrogate’ collective agreements for those workers too 
weak to engage in collective bargaining. The long-term aim was that the Boards would 
be replaced by voluntary collective bargaining between employers and unions at indus-
try level. This aim was never realised. By the 1920s Government reports proposed that 
no new boards be established. 
Major changes occurred following the Labour Party’s election victory in 1945. The 
Wages Act (1945) empowered the Minister of Labour to establish Wages Councils  (as 
opposed to Trade Boards) if existing voluntary collective bargaining arrangements were 
considered at risk. It also allowed employers and unions to seek jointly the abolition of 
a Wages Council where collective bargaining had been established. The most important 
element, however, was the Councils’ increased powers to settle all aspects of pay, hours 
and holidays in contrast to the more restricted scope of Trade Boards. 
Wages Councils consisted of representatives from both sides of industry, together with 
independent members. The role of the independent members was to conciliate between 
the two sides and, when agreement could not be reached, to vote in favour of one side or 
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the other.  Employer associations and relevant trade unions nominated members but all 
were appointed by the Minister of Labour who also had the legal authority to decide the 
scope of the industry to be covered by each Council. The Councils had the power to set 
detailed minimum rates of pay, including shift premia, for different age groups and ty-
pes of worker as well as complex holiday entitlements relating to length of service. At 
their peak, in 1953, there were 66 Wages Councils, covering about 3.5 million workers. 
The major sectors covered were retail distribution, catering and hotels, clothing, 
laundries and road haulage.  
During the 1960s and 1970s attitudes towards the Wages Councils changed conside-
rably. There was concern about the effectiveness of the Councils in tackling low pay, 
the resistance of employers to any real improvement in wage levels for those within 
their scope and the increasing complexity of the Wages Orders (the regulations issued 
by each Wage Council). Trade unions favoured voluntary collective bargaining as a 
more effective way to help the low paid reflecting in part a period when membership 
was increasing and national Government was creating corporate tripartite arrangements 
in key areas of economic policy. The trade union perspective was endorsed in 1968 by 
the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations (also known as 
the Donovan Report) and the report on low pay by the National Board for Prices and 
Incomes. The Donovan Report portrayed the Wages Councils as both ineffective in re-
medying low pay and an obstacle to the development of collective bargaining.2 In 1969 
the Labour Government established an inquiry into the idea of a NMW. Whilst a report 
was published no legislation was forthcoming (Department of Employment and Produc-
tivity, 1969, cited by Lourie 1995). 
The Industrial Relations Act (1971) made it easier to abolish Wages Councils and en-
couraged the establishment of collective bargaining machinery. The Commission on 
Industrial Relations, established by the Act, recommended the elimination of five Wa-
ges Councils, and between 1974 and 1979 the Labour Government abolished or merged 
a number of Councils. The 1975 Employment Protection Act enabled Councils to fix, in 
addition to minimum pay and holidays, ‘any other terms and conditions’. The Act also 
                                                 
2  The Donovan Commission assessed the tensions in the fragmented British industrial relations system 
which at this time were seen to be exacerbating unofficial industrial conflict and impeding productiv-
ity and economic growth. In summary, the Commission argued that there were two systems of indus-
trial relations in Britain: on the one hand, there was the ‘formal’ system of national agreements and 
conciliation procedures arranged between officials of unions and employers’ associations; on the o-
ther, there was the ‘informal’ system of ‘factory’ agreements concluded by bargaining between mana-
gements and individual workplace groups. The Commission suggested that the central defect of the 
system was the conflict between the two systems with actual wages and earnings largely determined 
through the informal system of bargaining between ‘shop stewards’ and management. The majority 
report of Commission favoured processes of voluntary collective bargaining and urged management to 
understand the nature of pluralism and to create the necessary organisational culture, mechanisms and 
environment to enable this to be effective. Trade Union recognition and representation with agreed 
methods of resolving disputes between employer and unions were identified as the key mechanisms to 
resolve the worst effects of conflicts of interest that arise between employers and employees. In the 
1970s subsequent Governments introduced  legislation aimed at restricting unofficial industrial action 
and increasing the effectiveness of official collective bargaining. 
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gave the Secretary of State power to convert Wages Councils into Statutory Joint Indus-
trial Councils as a move towards fully fledged collective bargaining. 
1.1 Conservative governments and the abolition of the fair wages resolu-
tion and Wages Councils 
The election of the first ‘Thatcher’ Government in 1979 marked a fundamental change 
in approach. During the1980s successive Conservative Governments deregulated much 
of the British labour market, reduced the powers of trade unions, privatised nationalised 
industries, and enabled the contracting out of services across much of the public sector.  
Simultaneously manufacturing employment declined, the service sector grew and the 
labour market was characterised by more part time and temporary employment 
contracts. The coverage of organised collective bargaining fell from its peak of 73 % of 
British employees in 1973 to around 47 % by 1990 (Milner 1994). 
The ‘Fair Wages Resolution’ had required companies contracting with public authori-
ties to pay the ‘going rate’ for the trade or industry, based on terms agreed in national 
collective agreements. The UK also was a signatory to the International Labour Organi-
sation (ILO) Convention 94 stipulating that public contracts should include clauses en-
suring that the wages and other conditions of the workers concerned were “no less fa-
vourable than those established for work of the same character”. In preparation for ex-
tensive privatisation the ‘Thatcher’ Government renounced the ILO Convention and 
abolished the Fair Wages Resolution in 1983. Subsequently ‘market testing’, contrac-
ting out and privatisation resulted in tens of thousands of public sector employees being 
transferred to private contractors. The Government however, was obliged by European 
law to introduce TUPE (the Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Employment) Regu-
lations in 1981, and these ensured that most existing employees were transferred to a 
new service provider on the same terms and conditions of employment. Over time, ho-
wever, the terms and conditions of many of those involved were to deteriorate, and the 
TUPE regulations gave no protection to new employees. Thus there emerged what pub-
lic sector unions later termed the ‘two-tier workforce’ (Unison 2004). 
The parallel reform of the Wages Councils commenced in March 1985 when the Con-
servative Government published a Consultation Paper proposing either abolition or 
radical change. By this time the number of Councils had been reduced to 26 although 
they still covered 2.75 million employees, about 11 % of the Labour Force (HMSO 
1985: iii). The Government Paper cited the findings of two Departmental research re-
ports which suggested minimum wages had negative employment impacts. Morgan et 
al. (1986), for example, examined trends in the clothing industry between 1950 and 
1979, and concluded that for male workers ‘real’ minimum wage rates had “exerted a 
small but nevertheless clear cut negative influence on employment”. Still more promi-
nence was given to the earlier findings of Wells (1983) into the relative pay and 
employment of young people. This research did not assess the impact of minimum wa-
ges specifically but revised previous Departmental conclusions by finding that an inc-
rease in the average earnings of young people below 18, relative to adult average ear-
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nings, had led to a fall in employment. These findings were contested, and other official 
research gave more mixed results (e.g. Craig / Wilson 1986).  
The House of Commons Employment Committee held an independent inquiry into the 
case for reform of the Wages Councils (HMSO, 1985). It found that most of those or-
ganisations that submitted evidence advocated reform but there was considerable oppo-
sition to outright abolition. Some employers and trade unions argued strongly for the 
retention or strengthening of particular Councils while others, in different circumstan-
ces, suggested their restriction or abandonment. Those most in favour of abolition in-
cluded the Department of Employment, the Institute of Directors, the National Federa-
tion of the Self Employed and Small Businesses and in a more qualified way the Con-
federation of British Industry (see Table 2 on relevant employer organisations). The 
Committee recommended that there should be reform but not abolition (ibid. p. xi). 
Subsequently the Government opted for less radical reform.  
Table 2:  Employer Organisations in the UK 
There are is an extensive network of employer and business organisations that lobby the British 
Government and European Union on behalf of their members. The most significant groups that 
have lobbied in debates on minimum wage legislation include: 
Confederation of British Industry (www.cbi.org.uk): The largest and best known employers’ 
confederation in Britain. The CBI represents the interests of its member companies at local, national 
and international level. It also provides information and research services. It does not carry out col-
lective bargaining on behalf of its members. Its membership includes some 250,000 public and 
private companies, half of them smaller firms with less than 200 employees, and most trade and 
employers’ associations. It nominates representatives to a wide range of public bodies in the United 
Kingdom and abroad, such as the Low Pay Commission and Employment Tribunals.  The CBI has a 
President and a full-time Director General who frequently acts as its main spokesperson. It is gover-
ned by a Council of some four hundred members. It may be regarded as the employers’ equivalent 
of the Trades Union Congress. It has no formal relationship with any political party.  
Institute of Directors (www.iod.com): The IoD is a non-party political organisation with upwards 
of 54,000 individual business directors in the UK. Members include Chief Executive Officers of large 
corporations as well as entrepreneurial directors of start-up companies from a wide variety of sec-
tors. The IoD represents the interests of its members to government and key opinion-formers at the 
highest levels. The IoD is a noted supporter of deregulated labour markets, a more limited role for 
the state and reductions in public expenditure.  
British Chambers of Commerce (www.chamberonline.co.uk): The BCC is a non-political, non 
profit making organisation, owned and directed by its members. They represent the views of an 
accredited national network of local Chambers of Commerce that include 135,000 businesses of all 
sizes and sectors representing over 30 % of the country’s workforce. Accredited Chambers are the 
single largest provider of government funded training. Accredited Chambers are local, indepen-
dent, non-profit making and non party-political organisations, funded by membership subscripti-
ons, that seek to represent the interests and support the competitiveness and growth of all busi-
nesses in their communities and regions. The Chambers provide a wide range of membership servi-
ces and the national organisation lobbies Government and other organisations on employment 
policies, EU directives and other related issues. 
 
The Wages Act 1986 preserved the 26 Councils then in existence but prevented any 
more from being established. It removed young workers under the age of 21 from the 
scope of the Wages Councils and ended the Councils’ power to set minimum holiday 
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entitlements, separate pay rates for different occupations, and premium rates for unsoci-
al hours or shift work. Consequently, Wages Councils were able only to set a minimum 
hourly basic rate; a minimum overtime rate; the number of hours after which overtime 
must be paid; and a daily limit on the amount an employer could charge for any living 
accommodation provided. Employers who failed to pay these rates were liable to a fine 
and for arrears of wages underpaid. The law was enforced by Wages Inspectors em-
ployed by the Department of Employment. In the 1980s and early 1990s the number of 
inspectors was reduced and they adopted a policy of ensuring that minimum rates were 
paid by persuasion rather than enforcement. Prosecution was rare, despite many instan-
ces of underpayment. 
In December 1988, the Government again issued a Consultation Paper which suggested 
the abolition of the Councils. In response there was no widespread support for abolition 
even from employers’ organisations; and, in March 1990, Michael Howard, then Secre-
tary of State for Employment, announced his decision not to proceed with abolition “for 
the present” (House of Commons Debate, 6 March 1990: col. 543).  
The Conservatives did not propose abolition during the 1992 General Election but the 
Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act that came into effect in August 1993 
abolished the Councils. The Government argued that they had no purpose in a modern 
economy and that they were riddled with anomalies, for example, there was a Council 
setting minimum wages in the ‘Ostrich and Fancy Feather and Artificial Flower’ in-
dustry, but none in the private security industry. In reality, however, the Councils cove-
red about 2.5 million workers, over three quarters of whom were women, mainly in low 
paid industries such as clothing manufacture, hotels and catering, retail and hairdres-
sing. Immediately prior to abolition the minimum rates they had set ranged from £2.66 
to £3.20 per hour.  
Agriculture was unaffected by abolition as its Agricultural Wages Board had been 
established under separate legislation. Whilst the Government had considered its aboli-
tion, opposition from both sides of the agricultural industry led it to back down.  
Following abolition there was growing evidence of jobs being offered below the old 
minimum rates and little evidence of increased employment in the deregulated indus-
tries. For example, a Low Pay Network study analysed almost 6,000 jobs offered at 
Jobcentres in the catering, retailing, clothing manufacturing and hairdressing sectors in 
April and May 1994. Over a third of the jobs on offer paid less than the old Wages 
Council rate uprated by inflation. In retailing, the figure was over 50 %. The network 
also found a net loss of 18,000 jobs recorded in the retail and catering sectors between 
September 1993 and March 1994, despite the removal of minimum wages (LPN 1994). 
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2 The Campaign for a National Minimum Wage 
The initial impetus behind the campaign for a NMW came from those organisations 
founded in response to what was called the ‘rediscovery of poverty’ in post-1945 Brit-
ain. In the 1960s there was concern about the limitations of the National Insurance and 
National Assistance system that provided income support for the unemployed, the sick 
and the elderly. Systematic research established that significant groups of children and 
older people were living in poverty. One consequence was the creation of a number of 
important ‘pressure groups’ that campaigned for increases in the level of publicly finan-
ced income benefits and their coverage. In particular, the ‘Child Poverty Action Group’ 
(CPAG) was established in 1968. Within a few years it was drawing attention to the 
connection between low wages and child poverty and to the limitations of the Wages 
Councils in providing protection for low paid workers, especially in the growing indust-
ries that fell outside their wage setting powers. The first Director of CPAG subsequently 
helped create an independent Low Pay Unit (LPU) whose purpose was specifically to 
campaign for the introduction of a NMW.  
The campaign for a NMW attracted support from welfare organisations and charitable 
trusts but in the 1970s the British trade union and labour movement regarded the exten-
sion of collective bargaining and industrial democracy as the key vehicle for securing 
adequate living wages for all workers. Indeed, many viewed the system of Wages 
Councils as an impediment to collective mobilisation that institutionalised low pay ra-
ther than challenged it.  
The situation changed dramatically after 1979 and with diminishing trade union power 
and increasing Government deregulation of the labour market there was an increase in 
labour movement support for the introduction of a NMW. The most significant figure 
was Rodney Bickerstaff, the General Secretary initially of the National Union of Public 
Employees and then the merged union ‘Unison’ that brought together all local govern-
ment workers into Britain’s largest public sector trade union. Bickerstaff gave financial 
and organisational support to the campaign of the Low Pay Unit and there was growing 
support from those unions whose members were most affected by the changes to Wage 
Councils, such as, the Transport and General Workers Union (T&GWU) and the Union 
of Shop, Distribution and Allied Workers (USDAW). Labour controlled municipal 
authorities also helped establish a network of independent regional Low Pay Units (inc-
luding one for Scotland). 
By the late 1980s the Low Pay Unit had established a ‘Low Pay Forum’ bringing to-
gether trade unionists, parliamentarians, academics and representatives of the voluntary 
and business sectors, to establish the rate at which a NMW should be set and how it 
should be implemented (LPU 1998). The Forum argued for a target level of a NMW of 
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“two-thirds of average male full-time earnings”, deciding on this particular level by 
reference to the Council of Europe’s ‘decency threshold’.3 
Successive Trades Union Congress (TUC) and Labour Party Conferences were to de-
bate the NMW and, as trade union membership contracted and low paid jobs multiplied, 
opposition declined, although some trade unions representing skilled workers continued 
to express concern about the possible impact of the NMW on wage differentials and 
collective bargaining.  
By the 1990s the Labour Party was committed to the introduction of a NMW “starting 
at a level of 50% of median men’s earnings” and rising “over time” to “two-thirds of the 
median hourly rate” (LP 1991). In the 1992 General Election, Labour’s Manifesto 
promised that “we will end poverty pay and bring Britain into line with the rest of 
Europe by introducing a statutory minimum wage of £3.40 an hour (a reform) which 
will benefit around four million low paid people, 80 % of whom are women” (LP, 
1992).  
Following Labour’s defeat in 1992, when the Conservative Party had campaigned 
strongly against the NMW, Labour reviewed its position. This review was given additi-
onal impetus by the Government’s decision to abolish Wages Councils. The  most in-
fluential report was that from the independent Commission on Social Justice established 
by the Labour Party leadership, under the auspices of the Institute for Public Policy Re-
search, to “develop a practical vision of economic and social reform for the 21st cen-
tury’ (CSJ 1994). The report outlined a radical strategy to develop an ‘intelligent wel-
fare state” and proposed that “welfare must be reformed to make work pay” because 
“paid work for a fair wage is the most secure route out of poverty” (ibid p. 223). It ar-
gued that a NMW was “essential to social security benefits reform to set a wages floor 
at the bottom of the labour market” (ibid p. 201). It also called for ‘intelligent’ labour 
market regulation where a NMW would, amongst other things, “encourage employers to 
invest in people” and stop low pay being used to subsidise inefficient producers and 
obsolescent technologies (ibid p. 205). The Commission did not, however, advocate 
linking the NMW to a set level of average earnings. It argued that there were “good 
reasons” for setting the initial rate “with some caution” and that a future Government 
“should set the minimum wage in relation to the state of the labour market” (ibid p. 
205). 
                                                 
3 The Council of Europe’s Social Charter, in Article 4, established a “right to fair remuneration” that will 
give workers and their families “a decent standard of living”. This right is to be secured by “freely 
concluded collective agreements, by statutory wage-fixing machinery, or by other means appropriate 
to national conditions”. The Charter itself does not spell out how to calculate the level of remuneration 
that would yield a “decent standard of living”, but the Council commissioned a report in 1977 that 
proposed that the “decent” wage level should be set at “68 % of the average wage”. The Committee of 
Independent Experts (which has the task of assessing how far the Charter’s signatories comply with its 
terms) adopted this “decency threshold” of 68 % as a working benchmark, although it recognised that 
other factors such as substantial social payments and family and housing subsidies could be taken into 
account (Lourie 1995: 13). 
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By the time it came to write its manifesto for the 1997 General Election, the Labour 
Party had dropped its support for the “half male median earnings” formula in favour of 
a “sensibly set minimum wage” based on consultation with industry (LP 1997: 17): 
There should be a statutory level below which pay should not fall - with the 
minimum wage decided not on the basis of a rigid formula but according to the 
economic circumstances of the time and with the advice of an independent low 
pay commission, whose membership will include representatives of employers, 
including small business, and employees. 
In contrast the TUC remained committed to the wage-related formula and at its 1996 
Congress argued that “the NMW must be based on some benchmark of social justice-a 
generally accepted notion of what constitutes a fair wage. That is why the Congress has 
consistently expressed support for the formula of half male median earnings”. Individu-
al unions, in particular, Unison and the T&GWU indicated also that they would conti-
nue to campaign for a NMW based on the formula.4 
                                                 
4 It is important to note that there was much debate about how this precise figure should be calculated. 
The two resolutions carried at the 1996 Congress recognised that the formula could be interpreted in dif-
ferent ways using different datasets. Congress endorsed the interpretation of the formula which generated 
the figure of £4.42 an hour. This was produced using the 1996 New Earnings Survey (NES) by taking 
male median weekly earnings (including overtime), dividing by the average number of hours worked per 
week by men and women (excluding overtime) and then dividing by two. Congress also recognised that a 
calculation of half male median hourly earnings using the 1995 NES produced a figure of £3.80 and that a 
similar calculation using the Labour Force Survey (LFS) produced a figure of £3.58 (Lourie 1997: 22). 
The discrepancy between the results of these two main indicators of earnings in the UK was to impact 
also on the subsequent work of the LPC, resulting in 2004 in the introduction of a new ‘Annual Survey of 
Hours and Earnings’. 
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3 The Conservative Government’s Strategy and Opposition to 
a NMW 
The Conservative Party, prior to 1999, was firmly opposed to any form of minimum 
wage. This reflected its conviction that deregulated, flexible labour markets are more 
efficient and that a minimum wage would “destroy jobs”. As its 1992 Election mani-
festo expounded (Lourie 1995: 4): 
Over the last 13 years, we have legislated to lift regulatory burdens from the 
shoulders of those who create jobs in Britain. To industry's relief, we shunned 
the job–destroying European Social Charter. And we reject Labour’s job-
destroying notion of a national minimum wage. 
Labour's proposals for a NMW became a major political issue in the run-up to the 1992 
election. Frequently, Conservative spokespeople claimed that Labour's proposals could 
lead to the loss of up to 2 million jobs.  
In the 1980s and 1990s the Conservative strategy for tackling unemployment was to 
deregulate wages and encourage the unemployed to be flexible and accept low paid 
jobs. The purchasing power of ‘out of work benefits’ was reduced and this was supple-
mented for the unemployed by the introduction of a ‘stricter benefit regime’ that put 
more pressure on individuals to accept available jobs. In 1989, for example, legislation 
was introduced that stipulated that after three months unemployment a person could no 
longer reject a job because it did not pay ‘the going rate’. A person could not reject a 
job either because it would make them worse off than on benefits, only directly incurred 
work expenses were relevant. In order to improve work incentives means tested support 
for rent and local taxes could be claimed by the low paid and the Conservatives expan-
ded a small ‘Family Income Supplement’ that was paid to poor working parents. In 
1986 this was changed to ‘Family Credit’ which was paid directly to low wage families 
with dependent children (see later section on ‘Making Work Pay’). 
In the UK employment levels increased but so too did earnings inequality, leading to a 
substantial degree of in-work poverty, particularly among families with young children, 
and a consequential increase in dependence on ‘in work’ social security benefits. Be-
tween 1987 / 88 and 1996 / 97 expenditure on Family Credit (and its predecessor Fam-
ily Income Supplement) rose, in cash terms, from nearly £200 million to just over £2 
billion. About three-quarters of a million families received Family Credit in May 
1997 (LPC1 1998: 31). In addition, ‘means tested’ Housing Benefit and Council Tax 
Benefit were paid by Local Authorities to almost a quarter of a million working families 
and single people. 
The Government’s position was supported by a range of employer led bodies, including 
the Institute of Directors and the Confederation of British Industry (CBI).  In 1995 the 
CBI published a report, ‘A National Minimum Wage: the employers’ perspective’ and 
concluded: 
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The key determinant of the impact is the level at which a minimum wage is set, 
but the overwhelming conclusion is that even a low minimum wage would redu-
ce job opportunities and create major problems for wage structures in a wide 
range of companies… It is also an inefficient way to tackle poverty … Much of 
the benefits of a minimum wage would go to households which are not actually 
in poverty. 
Employers were concerned too that the impact of the NMW would be amplified because 
of the industrial relations trend in the UK where national collective bargaining had lar-
gely disappeared and been replaced by a very decentralised system. A paper prepared by 
David Yeandle of the Engineering Employers' Federation identified four issues of con-
cern (Lourie 1997: 32): 
1. Pay Differentials: In many organisations, pay structures, particularly at the lower 
end, were relatively tight. The introduction of a NMW could lead to the consolida-
tion of pay into fewer pay bands, but pressure to re-introduce differentials would be 
likely not only from trade unions but also from managers eager to encourage em-
ployees to take on more responsibilities. 
2. The ‘Going Rate’: Many employers had been able to persuade their employees that 
pay increases should be determined more by the success of the individual company 
than by any external factors such as the inflation rate or pay increases elsewhere. 
Annual increases in the NMW could re-establish the importance of the ‘going rate’. 
3. Pay Structures: There had been a move away from basic rates to more incentive 
payments, bonuses, and fringe benefits (such as pension contributions). If the NMW 
was set as an hourly rate, employers would be encouraged to consolidate incentive 
payments into the hourly rate. 
4. Contracted Out Services: The impetus behind the extensive contracting out of 
non-core services, in both private and public sectors, had come from the fact that 
such services (typically cleaning, catering and security) could be provided more 
cheaply in this way as the workers tended to be paid less. The introduction of a 
NMW could remove this cost differential and encourage a move back to the provi-
sion of services in-house. 
3.1 The research evidence about the employment impacts of a NMW and 
the influence on the Labour Government’s policy 
By the General Election of 1997 the arguments for and against the introduction of a 
NMW had been clearly established (for clarification they are outlined in Table 3).  
Whilst the claims reflected different political perspectives, they all drew on research 
evidence.   In doing so they relied on a body of British literature that by 1997 included 
macroeconomic and applied research studies, as well as literature reviews that cited 
evidence from the extensive and diverse range of national and international studies 
about the impact that minimum wage regulation had on employment levels (e.g. Walsh 
1991, Dolado et al. 1996).  
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Much of the econometric literature reflected conventional wisdom from price theory 
which suggests that a minimum wage causes fewer jobs to exist than would otherwise 
be the case. A range of empirical studies gave support to this thesis, claiming that a 
NMW may have negative impacts on particular groups, especially young workers, and 
in particular sectors, such as the clothing industry. Other analysts suggested that higher 
minimum wages may encourage employers to cut back on training, thereby depriving 
low paid workers of an important means of long term advancement, in return for a small 
increase in current income. Other studies, many published by the OECD, indicated that 
inflexible and high minimum wage rates, relative to average earnings, also had negative 
employment effects.  
The evidence from other applied research evidence suggested, however, a more 
complex reality. Some studies suggested that any negative impacts of a NMW would be 
offset by improved work incentives, a redistribution of purchasing power, and a reduc-
tion in poverty. Others suggested that minimum wage rates would encourage employers 
to invest in training to improve the productivity of low paid workers. Econometric stud-
ies found that employment in low-paying sectors declined as a result 
of the decreasing effectiveness of the Wages Councils (Machin and Manning 1994, Dic
kens et al. 1993). In a similar vein, studies of the UK Equal Pay Act 1970 found that 
while the legislation was responsible for a considerable improvement in female relative 
pay levels female employment increased by some 17 % (Zalzaba and Tzannatos 1985).  
By the early 1990s the work of a new group of economists in the USA was to further 
challenge prevailing assumptions. In a study of the fast food industry, for example, Card 
and Krueger found that after a raise in the minimum wage in New Jersey employment 
actually increased by about 13 % relative to stores in nearby eastern Pennsylvania that 
continued to pay a lower rate. The authors suggested that stores paying low wages often 
were plagued by high turnover and job vacancy rates and that the higher minimum wage 
may have ameliorated such problems and led to an increase in employment. In a com-
prehensive assessment of minimum wage increases in New Jersey, Texas and Califor-
nia, Card and Krueger concluded also that “some of the new evidence points towards a 
positive effect of the minimum wage on employment; most shows none at all”. They 
pointed out that in the USA, the debate over the minimum wage had shifted from the 
question of whether increases in the minimum wage caused small or large job losses to 
the question of whether such increases caused any loss of jobs at all (1994: 236): 
The consistent finding of weak or negligible employment effects in both the 
United States and elsewhere suggests that the problem may lie in the textbook 
model, rather than with the evidence. 
Despite being heavily criticised, Card and Krueger’s work was influential in the ap-
proach adopted by the Clinton Administration that coupled increases in the minimum 
wage with extensive tax credits paid to low paid employees to help ‘make work pay’. 
This combination was to assist in the formation of a distinctively New Labour strategy 
for the NMW that was to be increasingly viewed as an adjunct to its emerging ‘welfare 
to work’ strategy, rather than a tool for reducing wage inequalities. 
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Table 3: The Case For and Against the National Minimum Wage. 
For:  
1. Protection of vulnerable workers from exploitation by employers hoping to undercut competi-
tors. 
2. A minimum wage could encourage the efficient use of labour through additional training and 
productivity measures. Employers would have to compete on the quality not the price of their la-
bour force. Employees would be more committed if they were paid and valued more. 
3. Low pay often reflects an undervaluation of employees’ skills. A NMW would help low-paid wo-
men workers, particularly in occupations such as cleaning, catering and caring where their skills are 
unrecognised and paid below their marginal value. 
4. It would help tackle poverty, reduce dependence on social security and increase Government 
revenue from tax and national insurance contributions. 
5. It is wrong in principle that a full time worker should not earn enough from his or her work to 
provide a reasonable basic standard of living. 
6. It can increase consumer purchasing power through raising the income of low wage workers 
who spend their income more rapidly in the purchase of goods (for example, food and clothing) 
which are produced by traditional low wage industries. 
Against: 
1. It would lead to job losses, both directly among those paid less than the minimum and indirectly 
through knock-on effects on the higher paid. 
2. It would lead to an erosion of differentials and so to incentives to acquire new skills. 
3. It takes no account of the circumstances of individual workers or employers. 
4. Companies need flexibility in their pay structures. 
5. It would not help the poorest groups as most of them are unemployed, retired, disabled or y-
oung. 
6. Many of those who benefit would be part-time married women workers or young casual work-
ers (such as students) in relatively well off two earner households. 
7. It would increase inflationary pressures as higher labour costs feed through into prices. 
8. It would undermine international competitiveness. 
 
3.2 The national minimum wage and the Low Pay Commission 
Following its election in May 1997, the New Labour Government included the NMW in 
its programme for its first Parliamentary session. During the summer, a preliminary 
non-statutory Low Pay Commission (LPC) was established to start taking evidence on 
the level of the NMW and in November, the National Minimum Wage Bill was intro-
duced in Parliament, and subsequently enacted in 1998. 
The legislation made clear that a NMW “cannot and does not deal with all the problems 
associated with low pay, low productivity and associated low income”. Its aim was to 
“alter the balance in the labour market by giving workers the right to a basic minimum 
level of earnings from employment”.  
The NMW Bill outlined provisions to establish the legislative framework for a NMW 
and establish the LPC on a statutory basis. It made it clear that there would be a single 
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national hourly rate of pay to cover all workers, except the genuinely self employed. 5 
There had been much debate about whether variations would be allowed in the NMW, 
but the only exception indicated was for a lower rate or exclusion for young people aged 
below 26. Variation based on industries, geography, or size of firm, were all rejected 
because they would create undue complexity, confusion about coverage, hamper enfor-
cement and create the potential for unfair competition. 
The Bill provided for a range of enforcement mechanisms. Key issues such as the level 
of the NMW and the elements of pay to be included in its definition were, however, to 
be left to statutory regulations that would be placed before Parliament after the LPC had 
reported.6 
The Commission's terms of reference were to (LPC1 1998: 13): 
• Recommend the initial level at which the NMW might be introduced; 
• Make recommendations on lower rates or exemptions for those aged 16–25; and 
• Consider and report on any matters referred to it by Ministers. 
In making its recommendations, the Commission was instructed to “have regard to the 
wider economic and social implications; the likely effect on the level of employment 
and inflation; the impact on the competitiveness of business, particularly the small firms 
sector; and the potential impact on the costs to industry and the Exchequer”. The Com-
mission was asked to report to the Prime Minister on these matters by the end of May 
1998. 
3.2.1 Making work pay: from family credit to tax credits 
At this time the NMW was also linked explicitly with the Government’s review of the 
tax and benefit system that New Labour had committed itself to undertaking in its 1997 
Manifesto. A task force was established to review how the tax and benefit system could 
be modernised to ‘make work pay’ by reducing the disincentive effects of the ‘poverty’ 
and ‘unemployment’ traps. 7 The structure of in-work benefits that had been inherited 
from Conservative Governments was seen to be too limited. The maximum financial 
support available, the level at which support began to be withdrawn and the high with-
drawal rate combined to ensure that only those with very low in-work incomes could 
benefit. In-work benefits were only increased in line with prices, there was little as-
                                                 
5 The genuinely self employed are defined as those individuals who are in business on their own account; 
control their own time; raise invoices; and work for more than one client. 
6 In Britain the primary legislation outlined in Acts of Parliament frequently gives the relevant Secretary 
of State the powers to subsequently introduce secondary legislation in the form of detailed regulations. 
These regulations must be approved by Parliament but are not subject to the full process of Parliamen-
tary debate and scrutiny applied to initial primary legislation. Many detailed issues of implementation 
and subsequent amendment to the NMW have been approved through such secondary legislation. 
7 The concept of ‘traps’ distinguishes the two ways in which the interaction of the tax and benefit system 
with wages impacts on work incentives. First, the incentive to move off benefits into work can be 
weak, because the difference between in-work and out-of-work income is too small - the unemploy-
ment trap. Second, when those in work have limited incentives to increase their hours or to move up 
the earnings ladder because it may leave then little better off - the poverty trap. 
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sistance with child care, and the credits were paid through the benefit system blunting 
the association with employment. 
The distinctive role that the NMW was given in New Labour’s ‘make work pay’ strate-
gy was linked with the way in which it interacts with the social security and benefits 
system. The difference with the Conservative Government’s approach to in-work bene-
fits reflects a choice between a system based on a wage-substitute or the combination of 
a minimum wage in conjunction with social security benefits to provide incentives for 
the non-employed to re-enter the labour market at a wage level which makes it worth 
their while to work. Under the Conservatives, between 1986 and 1997, social security 
benefits were targeted on low-paid earners with families at the same time as minimum 
wage regulation was withdrawn. Because these benefits were means tested they were 
progressively withdrawn as earnings from wages increased, so extending the ‘poverty 
trap’. Since employers could reduce wages or at least avoid increasing them in the 
knowledge that the difference would be met by social security, the Government was in 
the position of subsidising low-paying firms which were often among the least efficient 
in terms of productivity.  
New Labour’s combination of a NMW and tax credits by contrast changed the emphasis 
with social security expenditure now building on the level set by the minimum wage 
rather than directly substituting for it. In the Labour Government’s first ‘welfare to 
work’ budget in July 1997 the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that Family 
Credit would be replaced by a new Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) and that there 
would be reductions in income tax and national insurance contributions for low paid 
workers. The WFTC was more generous than Family Credit with a higher earnings 
threshold, gentler taper at which benefit is withdrawn and more generous assistance 
with childcare costs (see Table 4). The new tax credit was to reach 1.4 million families 
and cost around £5 billion a year, in comparison with the 757,000 families that had been 
helped by Family Credit at a cost of £2.35 billion in 1997 / 98. This ‘make work pay’ 
strategy was to be implemented alongside New Deal employment programmes that 
would provide assistance for the long term unemployed, lone parents and people with 
disabilities to get jobs. 
Table 4:  Main Characteristics of Family Credit and Working Families 
Tax Credit 1998 / 99 
 
Family Credit 
Administered and assessed by the Benefits 
Agency 
Claimed by woman in a couple 
 
Paid by direct debit to bank account or a BA 
order book (cashable at a Post Office) 
Main earner must be working 16 hours per 
week or more 
Working Families Tax Credit 
Administered and assessed by the Inland 
Revenue 
Claimed by man or woman according to cou-
ple’s choice 
Paid through wage packet by employer or 
direct from Inland Revenue 
Main earner must be working 16 hours per 
week or more 
Extra credit for those working 30 hours or 
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Extra credit for those working 30 hours or 
more per week 
Paid over a six month period 
Started to be withdrawn once net income 
reached £79 per week 
Withdrawn at the rate of 70 pence for each 
extra £1 over threshold 
One adult credit per household, plus age 
related credit for each child  
Contained some help with childcare costs 
Capital over £8,000 disqualified from benefit; 
capital between £3,000 and £8,000, assumed 
investment income reduces benefit propor-
tionately 
more per week 
Paid over a six month period 
Started to be withdrawn once net income 
reached £90 per week 
Withdrawn at the rate of 55 pence for each 
extra £1 over threshold 
One adult credit per household, plus age 
related credit for each child 
More generous help with childcare costs 
Capital over £8,000 disqualified from benefit; 
capital between £3,000 and £8,000, assumed 
investment income reduces benefit propor-
tionately 
 
 
Subsequently New Labour has further extended the scope and generosity of tax credits 
and in April 2003 a new Working Tax Credit was introduced with support for children 
now paid through a separate Child Tax Credit (paid direct to the main carer). Eligibility 
for the WTC was also extended to childless low paid workers aged over 25 years.   By 
January 2004 2.3 million families and low income households were benefiting from the 
WTC, with 300,000 benefiting from the additional component that subsidises childcare 
costs (Budget 2004: 96). In this context the NMW acts as a “foundation for tax credits” 
as well as establishing a “decent” minimum rate of pay (HMT 2005: para 4.3):  
The NMW and tax credits complement each other in achieving fairness combi-
ned with flexibility in the labour market. The NMW underpins in-work tax cre-
dits by ensuring a minimum rate of pay but it does not respond to household 
needs or the income of other workers in the household. By contrast, tax credits 
provide flexible support that can be tailored to an individual household’s needs, 
for example, reflecting the number of children in a family. They can also help 
parents balance work and family life by providing more support to those wor-
king fewer hours. 
Amongst other things the combination of a NMW with tax credits has enabled the Gov-
ernment to identify ‘guaranteed minimum incomes’ that apply to particular groups of 
low paid workers and to use this as a tool with which to individualise ‘better off in work 
calculations’ for unemployed claimants.8 This would not have been possible without 
the NMW. 
                                                 
8 There remain many issues about the interaction between the tax and benefit system, especially the inter-
action with Housing Benefit paid to low income people in rented accommodation. There have, how-
ever, been many related incremental reforms and these and the evidence base on their impacts are con-
tained in a continuing series of reports produced by Her Majesty’s Treasury ( see: http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/documents/taxation_work_and_welfare/work_and_welfare/tax_workwel_index.cfm)  
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3.3 The first report of the Low Pay Commission 
The Low Pay Commission started work in July 1997. It comprised a Chair, Professor 
George Bain, Principal of the London Business School and a former Professor of Indus-
trial Relations at the University of Warwick, and nine other members. The members 
were appointed on a personal basis and so were not representatives. Three had employer 
based credentials; three were from trade unions; and there were three academics. The 
members were unpaid, but received travel and subsistence expenses at the standard civil 
service rate. 
The Commission initiated the process of widespread consultation and analysis of re-
search and official data that has since characterised the methodology it has employed in 
every report that it has been asked to submit. It embarked on the “major task” of assimi-
lating and analysing the existing research evidence, and, from a number of sources, 
commissioned studies of data on low pay alongside econometric studies of existing pay 
systems and the likely impact of a NMW. It received nearly five hundred written sub-
missions from employers, trade unions and other organisations, and undertook a sub-
stantial programme of visits to over sixty towns and cities throughout the UK. This en-
abled it to hear directly from small firms, rural businesses, local outlets of national 
companies, low-paid workers, the unemployed, and those people on the fringes of the 
formal economy. 
The Commission found that there was no standard definition of low pay. Commonly it 
was considered as hourly rates falling within the lowest 10 % of earnings (the lowest 
deciles). But the level of the lowest deciles was not straightforward: it could range from 
little more than £3.00 per hour to more than £4.00 per hour (at 1997 levels) according to 
the source of the data and how they were interpreted.9 Similarly, it could be judged 
relative to the mid-point of earnings (the median), but variations also occurred in the 
definition of the median. The Commission instead decided to demonstrate the preva-
lence of low pay by considering the widening distribution of earnings in the UK where, 
for the previous twenty years, “workers on median earnings and those in the highest 
deciles had seen a much more rapid increase in earnings than the lowest-paid workers” 
(LPC2 2000: para 3.2). 
The LPC research established that widening earnings inequality had been associated 
with a significant increase of in work poverty. Low pay was more prevalent for certain 
                                                 
9 The LPC pointed out that these definitions were complicated also by the discrepancies that flowed when 
using data from the two regular primary sources on actual pay rates in the UK: the New Earnings Sur-
vey (NES) and the Labour Force Survey (LFS). The NES was an annual survey conducted in April of 
1 % of employees in the ‘Pay-As-You-Earn’ tax system which asked employers for earnings informa-
tion about its employees. The LFS, in contrast, is a random sample of about 57,000 households carried 
out four times a year. There were methodological issues with each survey but in general the former 
overstated the extent of low pay and the latter significantly understated it. The Office for National Sta-
tistics (ONS) provided estimates each year to reconcile these differences but in 2004 a new ‘Annual 
Survey of Hours and Earnings’ (ASHE) replaced the NES. ASHE now ‘over samples ‘in certain sec-
tors to improve coverage at the low end of the pay distribution, so “that ASHE can appropriately be 
used as the sole basis for low pay estimates”. The discussion paper on the ‘New methodology for low 
pay estimates’ can be found at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/nojornal/Final_low_pay . pdf.  
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groups of workers: women, young people, people with disabilities and minority ethnic 
groups. Its incidence was influenced by working patterns, because part-time and some 
casual workers were disproportionately low paid. Low pay also was more concentrated 
in certain regions and business sectors and in smaller firms. The pattern of low pay was 
not straightforward: the extent of low pay, and to whom it applied, was affected by a 
complex interaction of the above factors. In addition, the situation of low paid workers 
was “frequently complicated by the intricately interrelated systems of (income) tax, Na-
tional Insurance and in-work benefits” (ibid para. 3). 
During the consultation process the following key themes emerged (ibid para. 2.24): 
• Both employers and workers recognised that a NMW could bring business benefits. 
It could halt competition based on a damaging downward spiral of wages made pos-
sible by state subsidies to low-paid workers. It also could reduce staff turnover and 
enhance productivity. 
• Employers and workers overwhelmingly advocated a simple structure for the NMW 
that could be easily understood, managed and enforced. 
• Some businesses were facing “great difficulties” and were “genuinely concerned” 
about the rate at which a NMW would be set. 
• Although the incidence of low pay varied within and between regions, it was preva-
lent throughout the UK, and therefore a NMW had national relevance.   
• Pay varied considerably within and between business sectors and this would shape 
the impact of the NMW. 
• Many low-paid people felt undervalued, exploited and powerless to break out of the 
poverty trap. 
• A lack of affordable childcare caused significant barriers to work for many parents. 
• Further reform of the tax and benefits system was required so that increased earn-
ings from a NMW were not offset by significant cuts to in-work benefits. 
• Employers and workers generally supported a training rate for the NMW, but there 
was greater uncertainty about age-related rates for younger workers. 
• The informal economy posed a threat to reputable businesses and their staff: wor-
kers might not feel able to enforce their rights to the NMW, and disreputable 
employers could seek to evade the legislation. 
3.4 Low Pay Commission: first report recommendations 
The first report of the Low Pay Commission was published in June 1998, although its 
conclusions had been extensively ‘leaked’ in the media.  The main recommendation was 
that the NMW should be £3.60 per hour from April 1999, rising to £3.70 per hour from 
June 2000. It was proposed also that there should be a ‘Development Rate’ of £3.20 per 
hour introduced in April 1999, rising to £3.30 an hour in June 2000. This was to apply 
to 18–20 year olds and to those aged 21 or over during the first six months of a new job, 
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provided they received accredited training. All those aged 16 and 17 and all those on 
apprenticeships were to be exempt from the NMW. 
The Commission had assessed the more complex pay structures that applied to a signifi-
cant minority of low-paid workers that could include, for example, payment by results, 
commission, bonuses, and tips and gratuities paid through the payroll. It concluded that 
the definition of pay “should be simple and fair, easy to comply with and straightfor-
ward to enforce”, and that in “whatever way workers’ pay is defined or whatever hours 
they work, only pay for ‘standard’ working should count”. Hence employers should not 
be able to satisfy their obligation to pay the NMW by including benefits and premium 
payments, such as overtime and shift premia. The only benefit-in-kind that was to be 
taken into account was accommodation provided by the employer, for which an ‘offset’ 
would be allowed. The Commission concluded also that all actual working time should 
be covered by the NMW. Compliance was to be measured by averaging pay over the 
worker’s normal pay period up to a maximum of one calendar month. 
In addition to their legal obligation to pay the NMW the Commission proposed that all 
employers should display details of the NMW on pay slips. It proposed too that an e-
xisting Government agency should assume responsibility for verifying employers' 
compliance with the NMW. 
The Commission made clear that it did not regard the NMW as an implicit pay policy, 
or as an instrument for defining the ‘going rate’ for pay. Its introduction instead would 
ensure fairness for the low paid and be a “key element of the Government’s wider re-
forms, which aim to make work pay and help move people from welfare to work” (ibid 
para. 27). 
3.5 The National Minimum Wage  
The Government’s draft Regulations were published for consultation in September 1998 
with the final version - the National Minimum Wage Regulations 1999 - approved by 
both Houses of Parliament before coming into effect. 
The main features of the NMW were that it was to come into force on 1 April 1999; the 
rate for adults aged 22 and over was to be £3.60 per hour; the rate for 18–21 year olds 
was to be £3.00 per hour; and there was to be a ‘trainee’ rate of £3.20 per hour for 
workers aged 22 and over who were in the first six months of a new job and receiving 
accredited training. Apprentices aged below 26 were to be exempt in the first 12 months 
of their apprenticeship and the NMW was not to apply to 16 and 17 year olds. 
The NMW was to apply to all other workers, including homeworkers, employment a-
gency workers, pieceworkers and commission workers, but not to the genuinely self-
employed. Certain family workers and those employed to live as members of the family 
were to be exempt, as were certain participants in Government training schemes, work 
experience, and schemes for the homeless. 
Pay for NMW purposes was to be gross pay, including tax and national insurance 
contributions, and service charges distributed through the payroll. There was to be a 
maximum ‘offset’ for those workers who were provided with living accommoda-
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tion (initially set at £19.95 a week). Employers were not required to set out details of 
the minimum wage on regular pay slips but employers were required to keep sufficient 
records to prove they had paid the NMW. In the event of a dispute about whether the 
NMW has been paid, the burden of proof rests with the employer. 10 
Hours worked for NMW purposes essentially were to be contracted hours, actual hours 
or agreed estimated hours depending on circumstances and whether a worker was per-
forming time-work, salaried hours work, output work or unmeasured hours work. 
The NMW was to be enforced by the Inland Revenue (the operational tax raising 
agency of HM Treasury) or by individual application to an employment tribunal or 
court (see Table 5). 
Table 5: Employment Tribunals and Dispute Conciliation in the UK 
Employment Tribunals (www.employmenttribunals.gov.uk): Employment Tribunals are judi-
cial bodies established to resolve all disputes arising between employers and employees from their 
contracts of employment or from any statutory claims they may have against each other. These 
include unfair dismissal, redundancy payments, discrimination and the National Minimum Wage. 
Tribunals are made up of a High Court judge and two or more lay members who have experience 
of employment law. Lay members are nominated by employer organisations and trade unions. 
Tribunals aim to provide an easily accessible, speedy, informal and inexpensive procedure for the 
settlement of claims. Before hearing a claim an individual is expected to try to resolve any dispute 
through conciliation and make use of the service provided by ‘Acas’ (see below). Individual appli-
cants can be represented by third parties, such as trade unions or lawyers. The decision of one 
Tribunal is not binding on another. Individuals can appeal decisions to an Employment Appeal Tri-
bunal, but only on points of law. When cases go to higher courts then decisions may become bin-
ding and many key cases have established landmark judgements on the application of employment 
law that affect the rights of large groups of workers. 
Tribunals now receive over 100,000 cases a year and their ability to deliver an ‘easily accessible’ 
service has been undermined by the growing complexity of employment law, which is now a highly 
technical and specialised field. Various reforms have been introduced and a major review has re-
commended further significant changes in how they operate (see: 
www.dti.gov.uk/er/individual/etst-report.pdf)  
Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (Acas) (www.acas.org.uk): The British Govern-
ment has provided a national conciliation and arbitration service for promoting best practice in 
industrial relations and resolving major industrial disputes for over a century. The organisation was 
given a defined statutory role in 1976 and operates under the direction of an independent council. 
Acas is well known for the role it plays in trying to resolve major industrial disputes, such as the 
miners’ strike of 1984, but since the early 1990s much of its work has focused on individual 
complaints to employment tribunals. Acas has a statutory duty to provide conciliation services to 
tribunal claimants and about 75% of disputes are settled or withdrawn at this stage. Acas also 
provides individual advice and guidance and responds to same 750,000 callers each year.   
 
                                                 
10 Within two months of the beginning of employment in the UK an employer must generally give em-
ployees a written statement of the main particulars of employment. The statement should include de-
tails of pay, hours, holiday, notice period and an additional note on disciplinary and grievance proce-
dures. All employees are entitled also to an individual written pay statement, at or before the time of 
payment. This must show ‘gross’ pay before deductions; the amounts of any deductions and why they 
are deducted; ‘net’ pay; and details of how the individual will be paid (that is, by cash, cheque or di-
rect payment into a bank account). It does not have to include details of the NMW. 
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A ‘Regulatory Impact Assessment’, published on 16 February 1999, estimated that the 
NMW would increase total UK labour costs by about £2.4 (€3.53) billion a year (Lourie 
1999). It estimated that some 221,000 employees aged between 18 and 21 years, and 
1,683,000 of those aged over 21 years would receive higher pay as a result. This repre-
sented 14 % of all employed workers aged between 18 and 21 years, and 7.8 % of all 
employees aged over 21 years. Detailed forecasts showed that the estimated impact 
would be felt particularly amongst part-time workers, young workers, workers in the 
North East of England, Merseyside, and Northern Ireland and workers in the hotel and 
restaurant sector. 
Following publication of the Regulations, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
issued guidance on the NMW aimed at workers and employers. Implementation of the 
minimum wage was accompanied by high-profile publicity. The Government invested 
£5 million in press, television and radio advertising, and a post-implementation poll 
revealed that 80 per cent of employers and 72 per cent of workers - an increase from 30 
per cent before implementation  - knew the principal rate of the NMW (LPC2 2000: 3). 
Trade associations, unions and other organisations played an important part in preparing 
businesses and workers for the implementation of the minimum wage. Trade associati-
ons provided extensive guidance and support for members. The National Hairdressers’ 
Federation, for example, held a series of meetings throughout the UK. Articles on the 
NMW were published in various trade publications. Trade unions raised awareness of 
workers’ entitlement through helplines, promotional material and meetings. Voluntary 
organisations also helped awareness with, for example, the National Group on Home-
working distributing posters, leaflets and advice in a range of languages. 
Subsequent evidence found that many employers anticipated the NMW in their wage 
agreements well before its introduction, although some hospitality employers, typically 
owners of small single units, were vague about implementation plans, leaving compli-
ance to the last minute.  
What was remarkable was the absence of criticism from employer organisations that 
had, prior to the 1997 General Election, expressed their opposition to the introduction of 
the NMW. This experience was similar to that in Ireland where a NMW was introduced 
in 2000 and reflects wider experience reported in an EU survey where in all but one of 
the 8 pre-accession EU member states with a statutory minimum wage its continued 
existence was not considered to be a major political issue; the only exception was 
France (EFLWC 2005: 17) 
3.6 Subsequent reports from the Low Pay Commission and changes to 
the NMW 
The National Minimum Wage Act 1998 empowered the non-statutory LPC to make 
recommendations to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry on the first set of 
Regulations to be made under the Act. The Act enabled the Secretary of State then to 
establish the LPC as a statutory organisation, a status confirmed in October 2001. The 
membership of the Commission has changed with new appointments following the re-
signation of several members. The most significant was in 2003 when Adair Turner, 
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Vice-Chairman of Merrill Lynch Holdings, and former Director General of the Confed-
eration of British Industry (CBI), was appointed Chairman. 
The Commission has a full time secretariat with responsibility for monitoring the im-
pact of the NMW and responding to requests from the Government for formal reports. 
By 2005 there had been five such reports, with an additional one published on the posi-
tion of young workers.  
There have been slight differences in the terms of reference for each of the reports but 
the primary terms have remained similar and are clear in those issued for the report 
published in 2005. These asked the Commission to, (LPC PR 2004): 
• Continue to monitor and evaluate the impact of the NMW, with particular reference 
to the effect on pay, employment and competitiveness in low paying sectors and 
small firms; and the effect on pay structures. 
• Review the levels of each of the different minimum wage rates and make recom-
mendations, if appropriate, for change. 
In making recommendations for any rate changes, the Commission is instructed 
to “have regard to the wider social and economic implications; the likely effect on em-
ployment levels, especially within low-paying sectors and amongst disadvantaged peo-
ple in the labour market; the impact on the costs and competitiveness of business; and 
the potential costs to industry and the Exchequer”.  
The LPC has followed a similar pattern of consultation and evidence gathering for each 
of its reports. After its terms of reference have been published the Commission engages 
in a formal consultation process involving local visits and the submission of written and 
oral evidence from employers, workers and their representatives, and other interested 
organisations. Before considering its recommendations the Commission reviews official 
earnings data to determine the impact of the NMW, and of any potential increase, and 
reviews independent research findings. It also reviews developments in the minimum 
wage systems of other countries and, where necessary, has commissioned new research 
when responding to the terms of reference given to it by the Government.  
The Government is under no legal obligation to implement the recommendations of the 
LPC but there have been few disagreements. The most significant has been the LPC’s 
recommendation concerning the exclusion of young people from the full adult rate. The 
Commission has accumulated considerable evidence that few British employers make 
use of age-related pay scales and a high proportion of those that do pay the full adult 
rate to all workers aged 18 and over (Simpson 2004: 26). While endorsing the general 
justification for a lower minimum rate for younger workers, the LPC has persisted in its 
view that the full rate should apply from the age of 21. The Government retains its posi-
tion that the full rate does not and should not apply until age 22. 
The Government did, however, accept the LPC’s suggestion, in its fourth report, that it  
report separately on the desirability of bringing 16 and 17 year-old workers within the 
scope of the NMW entitlement, and if so the desirable rate.  The Commission had been 
concerned at the significant number of jobs held by 16 and 17 year olds that offered 
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“very low wages with little or no training and few development prospects”. Its subse-
quent report explored the available evidence, including any likely impact of a NMW on 
creating an incentive for young people to leave full time education and training. The 
independent research it commissioned found that “compared to other factors, wages 
would appear to have little influence” on the decisions of young people who either leave 
school or remained in education after age 16 or 17 (IER 2004. i). The Commission con-
cluded “that a wage floor for 16–17 year olds would help prevent exploitation” but that 
apprentices aged below 19 and 16–17 year old participants on specified 
pre-apprenticeship programmes should be exempt from the 16–17 year old rate (LPC 
PR 2004: iv).  It suggested that the rate be reviewed periodically but saw “no reason 
automatically to link its level to that of the youth Development Rate” (ibid para. 13).  
A significant feature of the recommendations of the LPC, and their subsequent imple-
mentation by Government, has been to give employers advance notice of any proposed 
increase in the minimum rate. This is evident in Table 6, that briefly outlines the main 
developments in the NMW following its introduction in 1999. The Commission sug-
gests that the process of consultation and advance notice has been a key factor in the 
generally successful implementation of the NMW (limitations in the enforcement proc-
ess are discussed later). 
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Table 6:  Main developments in the NMW after implementation in 
1999 
December 1999 The Government announced an increase in the national minimum wage.  
The LPC published their Second Report. 
June 2000 The young person's rate was increased from £3.00 to £3.20. 
October 2000 The NMW Regulations increased the main rate from £3.60 to £3.70 and made 
a number of minor changes, including how the minimum wage applies to so-
me trainees. 
January 2001 The LPC announced that it would produce its third report in two volumes, the 
first volume to appear in March 2001 and deal with the main adult rate of the 
minimum wage. The second volume to appear in May 2001 was to address 
other issues such as the youth rate, the age at which the main rate comes into 
force and the accommodation offset. 
March 2001 The Government published Volume One of the third report and accepted the 
recommendation that the main rate should increase from £3.70 per hour to 
£4.10 per hour on 1 October 2001. They also agreed in principle that the rate 
should increase again to £4.20 per hour on 1 October 2002 subject to econo-
mic conditions. 
June 2001 The government published Volume Two of the third report and accepted the 
recommendation that the development rate (including youth rate) should in-
crease from £3.20 per hour to £3.50 per hour on 1 October 2001. They also 
agreed in principle to a further increase to £3.60 per hour on 1 October 2002 
subject to economic conditions. 
August 2001 The second Annual Report on the NMW was published. This showed, among 
other things that despite a fall in the number of complaints of underpayments 
received, the amount of arrears recovered for workers increased significantly 
from £1.2m in 1999/2000 to £3m in 2000 / 2001. 
October 2001 Main and development rates of the NMW increased to £4.10 and £3.50 
respectively. 
August 2002 Main and development rates of the NMW increased to £4.20 and £3.60 
respectively. 
March 2003 The Government published fourth report from LPC and its response. 
March 2004 The Government published a report from LPC on rates to be applied to young 
workers recommending that a rate of £3 per hour be introduced for 16 and 17 
year olds. 
October 2004 Main and development rates of the NMW increased to £4.20 and £3.60 
respectively. £3 rate introduced for 16 and 17 year olds. 
February 2005 The Government published fifth report from LPC and announced that it would 
implement an increase in the adult rate to £5.05 and the youth Development 
rate to £4.25 in October 2005 and to increase the rates respectively to £5.35 
and £4.45 in October 2006. The Commission was asked also to review the 
operation of the 16–17 year old rate and to report in February 2006, with rec-
ommendations adjusted to take account of the absence of any up rating in 
2005. 
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4 The Impact of the National Minimum Wage on Low Pay, Pro-
ductivity and Employment 
The LPC has adopted an ‘evidence based approach’ in evaluating the impact of the 
NMW and making recommendations to Government. In doing so it has commissioned a 
significant body of independent research into the impacts of the NMW, regularly revie-
wed developments in the minimum wage systems of other countries, and worked with 
the Office of National Statistics to improve the official databases that inform its decisi-
ons. The findings from the commissioned independent research projects are published 
on the LPC website and each of the LPC reports reviews in detail the statistical and re-
search evidence used to inform its recommendations (www.lowpay.gov.uk).  For infor-
mation, Appendix A summarises the research projects that were commissioned by the 
LPC for its fourth report in 2003, giving detailed econometric, quantitative and qualita-
tive findings into the impacts of the NMW.  
This section briefly reviews the main findings from this literature into the impacts of the 
NMW on low paid workers, employers, employment levels and inflationary pressures. 
It considers also some of the other evidence about impacts that has been submitted by 
groups, such as the Confederation of British Industry. 
In its first report the Commission estimated that just under 1.9 million workers would be 
entitled to higher pay because of the NMW. By the time of the second report the esti-
mate of those who had benefited was revised to “well over 1.5 million” (LPC2 2000: 
14). The analysis of those who benefited showed that over two-thirds were women, of 
whom two-thirds worked part time. One consequence of the initial introduction of the 
NMW was that the gap between the average hourly pay of women relative to men nar-
rowed by a full percentage point, “the largest amount for almost a decade” (ibid p.16). 
The LPC stressed that it would take “several years” to “assess the full effects of the 
NMW” but its initial finding was that its introduction had “added only around 0.5 % to 
the national wage bill, with no measurable impact on employment” (ibid p. xi). Em-
ployment had continued to grow in low-paying sectors and there were “no signs of a 
significant minimum wage effect in the unemployment figures”. The Commission sug-
gested that few employers had experienced significant problems (ibid p. xii):   
Small businesses have been most affected, yet have successfully managed the 
transition. Each sector has had to adopt its own strategies to cope with the addi-
tional pay costs and, for some sectors or types of businesses within them, the ad-
justment has been considerable. Nevertheless, for the vast majority of employ-
ers, the transition has been successful. 
Evidence about the impacts of the NMW has improved in each of the LPC’s reports. By 
the time of its fifth report the Commission could draw on nearly five years of 
data (LPC5 2005). This report was able to analyse the findings from a detailed statistical 
analysis, specially commissioned research projects, consultation and visits, that exami-
ned in detail both the aggregate impact and the impact on those groups of workers and 
sectors of the economy most affected.  
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An important issue to emerge has been the discrepancy between the projections made 
by the LPC in each of its reports about the number of low paid workers who would 
benefit and the numbers who appear to have actually benefited. There are several rea-
sons for this. Firstly, the expansion of the British labour market has seen average wages 
increase faster than the projections anticipated in each of the reports. Secondly, since 
the Commission made its first recommendations the low pay statistics prepared by the 
Office for National Statistics which underpin their analysis have been successively re-
vised (for the latest revisions see www.statistics.gov.uk). One result is that the estimate 
of the numbers of low paid workers who have benefited from the initial introduction of 
the NMW has been revised downwards, to 1.3 million in the LPC’s third report in 2001 
and to 1.2 million in its fourth report in 2003. The initial estimate that between 1.4 and 
1.7 million workers would benefit from the most significant subsequent increase in the 
minimum rate in 2001 also was revised in the 2003 report to between 1.1 and 1.5 milli-
on workers. Similarly the 2005 LPC Report revised downwards the original estimate 
that 1.7 million workers would benefit from the 2004 increases when it found that only 
1.1 million jobs had directly benefited from the increase. Further research indicated that 
one of the factors explaining the discrepancy was that some employers were increasing 
wages at an earlier stage and ‘anticipating’ a subsequent increase in the 
NMW (LPC5 2005: 11–15). 
4.1 Statistical analysis in all the LPC reports 
The detailed statistical analysis in all the LPC reports illustrate that the prime benefici-
aries of successive increases in the NMW have been women, part-time workers, young 
people, disabled people and some minority ethnic groups, typically employed in low 
paid sectors and in parts of the country where low pay was more prevalent. The most 
significant impact has been on those working in elementary occupations, such as wait-
ing staff, bar staff, cleaners and porters, especially in the hotel and restaurant sector 
where nearly one in four jobs were affected (e.g. LPC4 2003: Figures 2.3 / 2.6). The 
two other occupational groups most affected have been sales and customer ser-
vice (including check-out operators and petrol pump attendants) and personal service 
occupations (such as hairdressers, care assistants, and playgroup assistants who work 
with pre-school age children).  
Another significant group to benefit from the NMW have been those low paid workers 
covered by what the CBI has described as ‘mezzanine pay setting’, where some em-
ployers have set their pay rates for staff who would otherwise receive the NMW at a 
slightly higher rate. The advantage for the employers involved is to attract and retain 
staff especially in high turnover employment sectors, with other employers wishing to 
be seen to pay above the minimum to enhance the image of their organisation. The CBI 
estimated that just under one in ten of the member companies surveyed had imple-
mented this strategy for at least some of their workforce, with the average ‘mezzanine 
level’ set at “39 pence (9.5 %) above the NMW” (CBI 2002: 3). 
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4.2 The impact of NMW on employment levels, inflation and productivity 
  
The political debate prior to the introduction of the NMW had focused on its likely im-
pact on employment levels. In its fourth report the Commission reported that between 
1999 and 2003 the impact of the NMW on employment levels - which overall had con-
tinued to increase in the UK - was negligible. Indeed, employment growth had been 
“stronger than average” among those groups and sectors most affected by the 
NMW (LPC4 2003).  Consideration previously had been given to the fact that employ-
ment may have risen faster in the absence of a minimum wage, but an econometric 
analysis for the third report concluded that “even after controlling for this and other fac-
tors the impact of the minimum wage was broadly neutral” (LPC3 2001:  xi). The fourth 
report found that the only exception was amongst young people where employment ra-
tes had fallen. After analysing the trends and related research evidence the Commission 
concluded that these changes in the youth labour market had been “primarily driven by 
the economic cycle, and that the minimum wage has had at most a minor impact on 
young people’s employment” (ibid para. 14).  
Although the overall evidence reported by the LPC found few negative employment 
impacts, there was evidence that some employers had reduced employment as a conse-
quence of the NMW. In 2002 evidence submitted by the CBI reported that in a survey 
of 380 member employers 12 % of those affected by the NMW reported making un-
specified job cuts as a direct result of the increase in the NMW in October 2001, up 
from 8 % of those who reported job cuts following the introduction of the NMW in 
1999 (CBI 2002: 8). Those reporting making job cuts were primarily in the hospitality, 
leisure, textiles and social care sectors. The LPC acknowledged the difficulties that a 
small minority, especially amongst the smallest employers, had in adjusting to the 
NMW. In 2003 it organised focus group research with such employers and found that 
they experienced problems for a number of reasons. For example, the employers repor-
ted that they had less bargaining power with suppliers, and less access to resources to 
meet the additional wage costs. They also commented that smaller firms employ fewer 
specialist staff, so when they cut back on staff they lose proportionately more skills; and 
that small firms were more likely to compete with firms operating in the informal econ-
omy (LPC4 2003: 78). The Commission suggested that Government agencies, such as 
the Small Business Service, and sectoral trade bodies continued to provide advice and 
consider other ways of promoting best practice amongst those small employers most 
affected. 
A further major concern about the impact of the NMW was about its possible impact on 
prices and inflation. This concern had been expressed by the Bank of England (1999) 
but following the introduction of the NMW it had found “a weaker-than-expected initial 
impact from the NMW (and that) the risk of a more substantial upward effect had been 
removed”. Subsequently, the CBI reported that competition and growth in low wage 
sectors had “kept prices lower than they would have been, preventing the rise in the 
NMW from being passed on despite rising employment costs”. Employers had overall 
adjusted to the NMW by “squeezing profit margins rather than raising prices” (CBI 
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2002: 7). The CBI warned, however, that there was “a limit in the extent to which this is 
possible in the longer term, especially for small and medium enterprises” (ibid p. 7). 
In 2003 the LPC itself suggested that overall the impact of a minimum rate on inflation-
ary pressures and the national “wage bill” had “been contained”, and that in particular 
there had been only a limited restoration of differentials above minimum wage levels. 
This was significant because the higher up the earnings scale that any NMW “differen-
tial effect bites, the greater the number of people gaining from higher wages, but the 
higher the cost to firms and the greater the danger of cost-push inflation” (2003 para 
2.34). The impacts of the NMW on differentials that were identified through different 
data sources tended to dissipate below £5 (€7.35) an hour. The impacts found below this 
level followed a “concertina effect”. For example, the effect of the small NMW uprating 
in 2000 was to produce lower increases at the bottom of the earnings distribution, and 
higher increases further up; whilst the impact of the 2001 uprating followed the pattern 
of introduction, with higher increases at the lower end of the distribution. The Commis-
sion argued that one effect of the pattern of NMW implementation of a relatively large 
increase in the minimum wage followed by a much smaller increase had been to drive 
up earnings at the bottom of the distribution in the year of a significant increase, that 
was then compensated for in the following year, when wage increases for the low paid 
fell behind average increases. This pattern of a significant increase followed by a rela-
tive ‘pause’ year gave employers “scope to restore differentials” and “time to consoli-
date previous increases” (CBI 2004:  4). 
In 2005 the LPC suggested also that the NMW had not had a direct significant effect on 
productivity, and that the gains in productivity that had commenced before its introduc-
tion had been maintained in most low-paying sectors. There was, however, evidence 
that some employers at least had absorbed the additional costs of the NMW through 
increased productivity. For example, in one survey carried out for the LPC in 1999 a 
hotel manager reported that they had increased pay throughout the organisation by con-
siderably more than was necessary to comply with the NMW, but calculated that the 
pay bill increase was greatly offset by increased employee effort, morale and commit-
ment and reduced turnover (cited in TUC 2000: 2). In a similar example, Burger King 
explained its decision to pay adult rates to its workers from age 18 as making it more 
competitive in a labour market with very high levels of staff turnover (ibid p. 2). Re-
search commissioned for the 2004 review found that “in the service sector there was 
evidence of a positive one-off effect on labour productivity following the introduction 
of the minimum wage” but “they found no significant impact on labour productivity in 
the manufacturing sector” (LPC5 2005: 50). 
Overall, the detailed research findings reviewed by the Commission in 2003 revealed 
that many changes have taken place in pay rates and structures in the UK labour market 
since 1999. Diverse factors have been involved and many adjustments in low paid sec-
tors had been made in response to competitive pressures as much as in response to regu-
latory changes, such as the introduction of the NMW, other employment rights, and the 
EU related Working Time Directive in 1998. It was clear, however, that many low paid 
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workers in the UK had benefited from the introduction of a NMW and that there had 
been few, if any, adverse employment effects. 
4.3 The NMW and ‘making work pay’ 
The LPC has no remit to assess the interaction between the NMW and tax credits 
though it has drawn attention to the complexity of the system and to the expenditure 
savings that the Government accrues from each increase, both from increased tax pay-
ments and from reductions in tax credit entitlement. These ‘savings’, however, have 
been nominal in that so far the Government has periodically increased the coverage of 
tax credits and the generosity of the technical rules that determine the rate at which ear-
nings are deducted from credit entitlement. These changes have reduced the number of 
households who face high ‘marginal deduction rates’ (the measure of how much of each 
additional pound in gross earnings is lost through higher taxes and withdrawn benefit or 
tax credits), with the latest reforms reducing the number of low-income households fac-
ing deduction rates in excess of 70 % by nearly half a million (Budget 2004: para 4.67).  
As the coverage of tax credits has been extended to more families, at higher incomes, 
however, there has been growing concern about the impact this has had. A report from 
the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, for example, points to the paradox that as the Gov-
ernment has extended the support available through means-tested tax credits for 
low-earning families the result of this increased generosity is that more people face 
some sort of benefit or tax credit withdrawal if their earnings increase. The very low 
paid are significantly better off but for many of those with relatively higher pay  there 
has been a “blunting” of the make work pay strategy with recent changes increasing 
“the number facing an effective marginal tax rate of over 50 % rising by almost 
900,000” (Brewer / Shephard 2004: viii). Others have pointed to “a nightmare for any 
form of collective wage bargaining around low wages” because “it means it is now im-
possible to say with certainty what a pay increase will be worth to particular employees, 
since this will depend on what the Chancellor decides to do about tax credit thresh-
olds” (Howarth / Kenway 2004: 18). 
Another paradox in the strategy in that when the NMW is increased those who benefit 
most are those who are not eligible for tax credits. Working families who are being sup-
ported through tax credits will have their credits reduced by varying amounts when they 
renew their claims. The Government suggests that this is an inevitable consequence of 
income related tax credits, albeit it has designed the system to ensure that work still 
pays significantly more than out of work benefits for tax credit recipients.   
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5 The Enforcement of the National Minimum Wage 
Table 7 contains official estimates from the ‘Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings’ of 
the number of jobs held by those aged over 18 that were paid less than the minimum 
wage. This table shows data from 1998 for comparative and impact purposes, measu-
ring the number of jobs involved in that year using the NMW rates that were actually 
introduced in 1999. The table illustrates the immediate impact that the NMW had in 
establishing a ‘wage floor’. Subsequent surveys show that since 2000 the number of 
jobs paid below the minimum rate has been between 230,000 and 320,000 and in spring 
2003 there were 272,000 jobs involved, covering about 1.1 % of the labour force (the 
data in Table 7 is rounded down).  
Table 7:  Jobs Paid below the national minimum wage held by those 
aged 18 or over 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Number (‘000s) 1210  470 230 230 320 250 272 
% of labour force 5.2 2.0 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.0 1.1 
Source: Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, ‘New methodology for low pay estimates’, Table 4, at 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/nojornal/Final_low_pay.pdf. 
Official statisticians stress, however, that it is not possible to determine which of these 
workers may have been eligible for the NMW as it includes the many groups who are 
exempt from the legislation.11 The TUC has suggested that as many as 60 % of these 
people should have been paid the minimum wage, but the CBI has argued that there 
have been only “isolated pockets of non-compliance” (2002: 28). 
The TUC has been proactive in providing information about the NMW to the low paid 
and individual trade unions in the low paid sector have included issues about NMW 
enforcement within their recruitment strategies. However, with fewer than 15 % of low 
paid workers in membership trade unions have recognised that many vulnerable low 
paid workers are beyond their organisational reach. In this context trade unions have 
supported the operation of an independent and effective enforcement agency. There has 
in fact been common ground with employers with the CBI arguing that “tough enforce-
ment is good for business” because it reduces unfair competition (CBI 2001). 
When introducing the NMW the Government suggested that the most effective strategy 
would be to ensure high levels of voluntary compliance and it has engaged in publicity 
campaigns to ensure that both employers and employees are aware of their rights and 
                                                 
11 This includes the self-employed; most company directors, workers under 16 years old, some appren-
tices and some trainees on government-funded schemes; higher education students on work experi-
ence; people living and working within the family; friends and neighbours (jobs done under informal 
agreements); members of the armed forces; prisoners; voluntary workers; residential members of reli-
gious and other communities. 
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responsibilities.12 The 1998 National Minimum Wage Act, however, also provides a 
legal framework through which action can be taken against those employers who seek 
to evade their obligations. The framework was designed to both be “fair and effective 
without introducing unnecessary burdens on business” (LPC1 1998: para 8.1). 
5.1 Legal contractual right to the NMW  
The 1998 legislation gave UK employees a legal contractual right to the NMW, and 
protects them from unfair dismissal if they seek to ensure that it is paid and / or seek 
restitution for any underpayment (see Table 8). This prevents employers from simply 
replacing workers who are entitled to the NMW, with those who might qualify for a 
lower rate or who are excluded from coverage altogether. There is no qualifying period 
of employment or upper age limit for such claims. Sections 23 to 26 of the NMW Act 
specify that dismissal in these circumstances will be automatically unfair and compen-
sated for in the same way as other unfair dismissals. In the case of unfair ‘actions short 
of a dismissal’ the individual will be compensated with an award which the tribunal 
considers “just and equitable in all the circumstances” taking into account the infringe-
ment complained of and the actual loss suffered. This clause ensures that workers who 
experience detrimental changes to their terms and conditions of employment from 
employers who try to evade the NMW can secure redress. This covers changes to, for 
example, paid holiday entitlement, cuts in overtime rates or hours, and reductions in 
working hours (LPC4 2003: 168). 
An individual employee has the right to examine their employer’s records if they think 
they are not being paid the correct amount. Employers have a legal obligation to keep 
adequate records to prove that they are paying the NMW. Requests to see employers’ 
records must be made in writing, and employers must make the records available within 
14 days. A worker has the right to be accompanied by a person of his choice when in-
specting the records. 
If an employer refuses or fails to make the records available, workers have the right to 
take the case to an employment tribunal, for an unauthorised deduction from wages un-
der Section 13 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. They may also take a case to a civil 
court by suing for breach of contract. In proceedings before a tribunal or a civil court 
the burden of proof is on employers to show that they have complied with the require-
ments of the NMW legislation. 
Because individual employees could be deterred from exercising their rights the Act, 
uniquely in British law, empowers authorised officers from the Inland Revenue (the tax 
                                                 
12 Despite the apparent simplicity of the national rate there are many complex rules and interpretations of 
different working conditions and what should be included in calculating wages. The Government, tra-
de unions, employer organisations and other bodies have supplemented general publicity and guidance 
about the NMW with a variety of more detailed guides, many of them available on the internet. The 
most comprehensive guidance can be found on the website of the Department of Trade and Industry 
(www.dti.gov.uk/er/nmw). The DTI site also has an interactive component for establishing individual 
entitlement known as TIGER or ‘Tailored Interactive Guidance on Employment Rights’ 
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raising agency of the British Treasury) to take cases to tribunal on behalf of workers.13 
This is a last resort, however, as certain complaints, such as those about access to re-
cords or brought by an enforcement officer, are dealt with first by officers from the 
‘Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service’ who attempt to resolve the case before 
a full tribunal hearing. The enforcement officer in particular may be able to secure 
compliance through the powers they have to issue formal civil notices with legal force 
and serve penalties on employers without recourse to a tribunal.  
Enforcement officers can act in response either to complaints by workers or others that 
an employer is not paying the NMW. They can also decide to carry out inspections of 
employers wage records at any time and have the right to require the employer or his 
relevant employees to produce and explain their records and provide additional informa-
tion that is necessary for establishing whether the NMW is being paid. Enforcement 
officers may also enter an employer’s premises at reasonable times to interview them, or 
require an employer to attend for interview at the Inland Revenue’s offices (DTI 
2001: 226). 
                                                                                                                                               
(www.tiger.gov.uk). The Inland Revenue also maintains a free telephone helpline for information on 
enforcement (0845 8450 360). 
13In the UK, it is up to the individual employee to secure their contractual rights from their employer, 
with support from a trade union if they belong to one or other organisations that may provide them 
with support. The employment tribunal system through which this can ultimately be achieved is an 
adversarial, lengthy and daunting one for individual employees. Not surprisingly it is the workers 
most at risk of malpractice by employers who are least likely to take a case to a tribunal, and least 
likely to fully understand what rights at work they have (Howarth / Kenway 2004:  20). 
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Table 8:  Unfair Dismissal in the UK 
Most employees in the UK who have completed one years’ continuous service have the right to 
complain to an Employment Tribunal if they are unfairly dismissed. Employers have the right to hire 
and fire people if they have a good reason. But in all such cases, the employer should have used a 
fair procedure and behaved reasonably in all the circumstances of the case. For example, they need 
to act in a transparent way, issuing warnings about someone’s behaviour or perhaps even offered 
counselling if appropriate. They need to have investigated the situation and reached the conclusion 
that dismissal is justified. If they do not, it could lead to a claim for unfair dismissal. If the employ-
er’s actions amount to a fundamental breach of contract, the employee can resign and claim 
constructive dismissal. There is also an indirect form of dismissal that could lead to a claim, and this 
happens when an employer treats the employee in a way that means they cannot do their job. For 
example, the employer could make the employee’s circumstances difficult by changing their terms 
or conditions without consultation, or changing the job location at short notice.  
In some circumstances, no qualifying period of service is needed. This includes a wide range of 
specified circumstance including in particular: 
• dismissal for qualifying for the national minimum wage or seeking to enforce a right to it (or because 
the employer was prosecuted as the result of enforcement action taken by the employee); 
• dismissal for reasons relating to the Tax Credit Act of 2002; 
• dismissal  for having sought, in good faith, to exercise a statutory employment protection right; 
• dismissal for taking, or proposing to take, certain specified types of action on health and safety 
grounds; or 
• dismissal for trade union membership or activities or for non-membership of a trade union.  
A case for unfair dismissal has to be brought to an Employment Tribunal within three months. The 
individual is entitled to third party representation but must first make use of the conciliation service. 
The tribunal will consider the circumstances that led up to the dismissal and the way it was carried 
out, and it has a number of remedies at its disposal if it decides the process was unfair. It can order 
the employer to reinstate the employee and treat the individual as if they had never been dismis-
sed, with all rights, privileges and any lost pay restored. It could also tell the company to re-engage 
the person, in other words order the business to re-employ the individual in a job which is compa-
rable with the old one. Before making such a decision, the tribunal must establish what the appli-
cant wants and whether the order is practicable in the circumstances of the case. 
Where neither of these remedies is appropriate, the tribunal can award compensation, and this can 
take into account any loss of wages, loss of future earnings and any loss of pension rights. In gene-
ral, it is limited to £50,000, but if the case was brought because of sexual discrimination, the award 
can be unlimited. However, the individual’s conduct and willingness to find another job are taken 
into account and the compensation has been reduced in some cases as a result. 
 
5.2 Enforcement actions 
Section 19 of the NMW Act gives the enforcement officers the power to issue enforce-
ment notices requiring employers to pay their workers the NMW and to make up any 
arrears. The employer has a right of appeal to an employment tribunal against such noti-
ces. If the employer fails to comply with an enforcement notice, the enforcement officer 
can complain to an employment tribunal on behalf of the underpaid worker or group of 
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workers, or take their claim for recovery to a County Court.14 The officer can also issue 
a penalty notice requiring the defaulting employer to pay a financial penalty to the Sec-
retary of State. There is a right of appeal to an employment tribunal against a penalty 
notice. This financial penalty is calculated at a rate equal to twice the hourly amount of 
the NMW in force at the time in respect of each worker to whom the failure to comply 
relates, for each day during which the failure to comply continues.  
Enforcement officers also have the power to prosecute an employer for up to six poten-
tial criminal offences, each of which can attract a fine of up to £5,000 (€7,350). These 
include:  
• refusal or wilful neglect to pay NMW; 
• failing to keep NMW records; 
• keeping false records; 
• producing false records or information; 
• intentionally obstructing an enforcement officer; 
• refusing or neglecting to give information to an enforcement officer 
The Government did not anticipate many criminal prosecutions, “except as a last resort” 
and after other enforcement mechanisms had failed. The main purpose of the enforce-
ment framework has been to ensure compliance rather than exact punishment.  
The Inland Revenue has a network of 16 NMW Compliance Teams throughout the UK, 
each with between 3 to 8 compliance officers (DTI / IR 2003: 12). These teams respond 
to complaints, and provide information to employers and employees about the minimum 
wage. This includes proactive strategies to raise awareness amongst low wage workers, 
for example, through outreach activities with community groups, and for targeting 
employers who are most unlikely to understand or undertake their obligations to pay the 
NMW. This activity includes also visiting a sample of employers about whom no com-
plaints have been made to check that they are meeting their obligations under the mini-
mum wage (ibid p. 6).  
In 2002 / 03 the compliance teams completed more than 16,000 investigations (ibid 
p.16). Table 9 shows that between 1999 and 2003 they issued just over 460 enforcement 
notices15, and pursued 89 employment tribunal cases (the vast majority of which found 
in favour of the enforcement officer). Over the same period just fewer than 25,000 em-
                                                 
14 The County Courts are the first contact most people have with the civil law process in England and 
Wales. They deal with most civil cases –those relating to family or property law - such as disputes 
over property and divorces. The County Courts host the ‘small claims court’ where most minor civil 
matters can be resolved with an informal arbitration. 
15 The reduction in the number of enforcement notices issued in 2002 / 03 was attributable to an Em-
ployment Appeal Tribunal that in 2002 determined that the Inland Revenue did not have the power to 
take formal enforcement action in respect of workers who were no longer working for the underpay-
ing employer. The Government acted to introduce a Bill into Parliament to restore the position. The 
National Minimum Wage (Enforcement Notices) Act 2003 became law in May 2003 and ensures that 
officers can act on behalf of former as well as current employees. 
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ployers were subject to a completed investigation resulting in arrears of nearly 
£13 (€19) million being recovered for low paid workers. The sector with the most com-
plaints was ‘market services’ (including car and other repairs, taxi firms and communi-
cations) followed by hospitality. As well as obvious cases of non-compliance there were 
cases involving poor understanding of the more complex areas of the legislation. This 
included, for example, employers who had misunderstood the rules for apprentices. By 
2003 there had not been any criminal prosecutions of employers. 
Individuals have the right to take their own case to an Employment Tribunal independ-
ently of the Inland Revenue. In 2000 / 01 852 individuals pursued such cases. In 337 
cases the NMW was the main issue before the tribunal; in 515 cases it was a subsidiary 
issue in a case that may have involved, for example, an unfair dismissal (LPC4 2003: 
Table 5.3). Unfortunately, the LPC gives little detail about the cases involved or their 
outcome. 
Table 9:  National Minimum Wage Inland Revenue Enforcement Ac-
tion and Arrears Recovered 1999-2003 
 Enquiries 
Received 
by 
Helpline 
Complaints 
of under-
payment 
Employ-
ers sub-
jected to 
comple-
ted in-
vestiga-
tion 
Enforce-
ment 
notices 
 
Arrears 
identified 
 
Average 
Arrears 
Per Wor-
ker 
Enforc-
ement 
notices 
 
Employ-
ment 
tribunal 
cases 
1999/00 120,562 4,591 6,041 136 
 
£1,242,341 
€1,826,241 
£200 
€294 
136 
 
12 
2000/01 77,473 1,823 7,256 213 
 
£3,034,373 
€4,460,528 
£410 
€603 
213 
 
26       
2001/02 77,610 1,813 5,368 86 £5,135,799 
€7,549,625 
£500 
€735 
86 27 
2002/03 28,994* 999* 6,238 26 £3,585,941 
€5,271,333 
£490 
€720 
26 24 
Total 304,639 9,226 24,903 461 £12,998,45
4 
€19,107,72
7 
n/a 461 89 
* Enquiries and complaints only for half year April to September 2002 
Sterling and Euros at May 2005 exchange rate of £1 = €1.47. Source: DTI and Inland Revenue, National 
Minimum Wage Annual Report, 2002/03; Low Pay Commission Report, 2003, Table 5.2 
The LPC itself has acknowledged the compliance problems faced by some disadvan-
taged workers, especially pieceworkers, homeworkers and those whose first language is 
not English or those who may have problems with literacy, and it has pushed for more 
targeted enforcement action. Other commentators have referred to the inability of some 
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workers to calculate their entitlement, a problem compounded by an insufficiency of 
information given on pay slips (Simpson 2004: 36).   
The LPC has concluded though that overall compliance with the NMW is high and that 
the twin-track structure of enforcement, using both the Inland Revenue and the Em-
ployment Appeal Tribunal system, has proved successful. By contrast some trade uni-
ons and labour lawyers are far more critical of the weaknesses they see in the regulatory 
regime. Various organisations representing the low paid have argued that the Inland 
Revenue should have wider powers to enable it to deal with cases of dismissal and det-
rimental changes in working conditions related to the NMW; a proposal resisted by em-
ployers and the LPC (LPC4 2003: 168). This issue is likely to become more contenti-
ous. Simpson, for example, suggests that if future up ratings increase the number of 
workers who should be entitled to benefit from the NMW then “the extent of non-
compliance which is effectively beyond the reach of the enforcement activities taking 
place would also be likely to become greater” (2004: 39).  
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6 Future Developments in the NMW 
Recent increases in the NMW represent a significant change. There has been no ‘pause 
year’, and in 2003 the NMW was increased by just over 7 % and in 2004 increased by 
nearly 8 %; significantly above the rate of inflation or increase in average earn-
ings (DTI 2004). The aim of the Government has been to increase gradually the number 
of people benefiting from the NMW. The latest increase implemented in October 2004 
is now estimated to have benefited 1.1 million low paid workers, with others benefiting 
from the ‘knock on’ effect on those employers who set ‘mezzanine’ pay rates just above 
the minimum. The LPC has noted that many employers reported they “were finding it a 
struggle to accommodate two consecutive large increases” but concluded “the up ratings 
have largely been absorbed without adverse effects” (LPC5 2005: vii). The increases 
proposed for 2005 and 2006 are more cautious but will still be greater than the expected 
increase in average earnings.  
This strategy has provoked political opposition, with the Conservative Party arguing 
that jobs are at risk from increases in the NMW and from the cumulative impact of la-
bour market regulation and ‘red tape’, albeit they are committed to retaining the NMW. 
The Institute of Directors (2003) has argued that recent NMW increases “jeopardise 
employment prospects for the low skilled” and the Director-General of the British 
Chambers of Commerce has stated that “minimum wage rises of 35 per cent over four 
years are becoming an unmanageable cost on business: it cannot continue to increase at 
three times the rate of inflation” (BCC 2004). In its submission to the 2005 review the 
CBI reported employers “expressing concern” about any future increase. The CBI has 
argued that more of its member companies are being affected by the NMW with nearly 
one in five of those it surveyed saying they would cut jobs to offset increased costs from 
the most recent increase. The CBI suggests that the NMW is now “impacting on the 
overall functioning of the labour market” and its submission argued that a further sig-
nificant increase in the NMW will add to a ‘squeeze’ on profitability, represent a threat 
to investment and put more jobs at risk from international competition, especially where 
employers can ‘out source’ jobs to low wage economies or to countries that pay a lower 
minimum rate (2004: 4). More jobs could also be displaced into the informal economy 
where NMW regulation is weak.16 
The TUC by contrast has argued that greater increases are needed if the two million low 
paid workers originally identified by the LPC are to benefit from the NMW. It advo-
cated an increase in the NMW to £5.35 (€7.86) in 2005, and to £6 (€8.82) per hour in 
2006, an objective that was echoed by individual trade unions and organisations repre-
senting or actively promoting the interests of low paid or low income households.  
                                                 
16 Employer organisations have complained about tax credit regulations and argued that the actual pay-
ment of tax credits should all be transferred to the Inland Revenue, reducing the administrative burden 
on the 300,000 employers now involved in paying tax credits.  
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There are more radical criticisms of the Government’s strategy. In particular, many of 
the organisations that campaigned to establish the NMW have been critical of the ‘cau-
tious’ strategy adopted by the LPC and the Government, and of the impact that tax cre-
dits have had on collective bargaining. In a report, commissioned by Unison from the 
New Policy Institute (NPI), it was argued that in treating “the symptoms of low pay” 
through the combination of a low NMW and tax credits, the Government was in effect 
subsidising many large and profitable employers (such as, supermarket chains) and  
(Howarth / Kenway 2003: 3):  
Undermining efforts to tackle the deeper causes of low pay, including low pro-
ductivity and weak organisation amongst low paid workers. By subsidising the 
employers of low paid workers, tax credits not only make low pay work eco-
nomically possible, they create disincentives for employers to do anything about 
it. While it may make sense to help prop up low paying firms or even industries 
facing temporary difficulties, it makes no sense to prop up indefinitely firms 
whose very existence depends on paying poor wages. 
Unison and other trade unions continue to campaign for what they call a “living wage” 
that would be indexed to average earnings and set at a far higher rate than the NMW, 
and they have made progress also in persuading some public sector employers to recre-
ate something like the ‘Fair Wages Resolution’ to gain parity and protect the wages of 
workers employed on public sector contracts (Unison 2004). The NPI has called for a 
comprehensive approach in what it describes as a ‘New Deal for the Low Paid’. This 
would include a Fair Wages Resolution with coverage for all private contractors delive-
ring public sector projects and services, supplemented by Government pressure on other 
private sector employers to adopt similar contracting principles. They also make the 
case for the introduction of stronger enforcement mechanisms around workplace rights 
and the NMW (Howarth / Kenway 2003). 
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Conclusion 
The Government and the LPC will continue to have to balance the demands of trade 
unions to increase the NMW further against the pressure from employers to keep costs 
down.  
Despite arguments about future strategy and the level of the NMW the evidence from 
this review of UK experience illustrates both the strengths and weaknesses of New La-
bour’s strategy for reducing low pay and poverty in Britain. Well over a million low 
paid workers have benefited from each increase in the NMW and, in combination with 
tax credits and other changes, child poverty has been reduced and there are 350,000 
fewer children under 16 in households where no adult works (Brewer / Shephard 
2004: vii). The introduction of the NMW also has not had the dire consequences for 
employment levels predicted by the Conservative Government in 1992 and New La-
bour’s reforms have increased employment rates. There remain, however, contentious 
issues around enforcement, coverage and the limited ambitions of the Government’s 
strategy.  
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Appendix A: Findings from recent Low Pay Commission Re-
search Projects 
Author 
and Or-
ganisation 
Aims and 
Objectives 
Methodology Results 
J. Druker, 
C. Stan-
worth and 
G. White 
University 
of Green-
wich Busi-
ness School 
To investigate 
the impact of 
the minimum 
wage in the 
hairdressing 
sector.  
 
Face-to-face interviews were held 
with the owner/manager at 48 
hairdressing salons throughout the 
UK. Employee interviews were 
also conducted in 24 of these 
salons. In addition training pro-
viders in three regions were inter-
viewed. Four focus groups were 
held with trainees. 
The industry has now largely adjusted to 
the NMW and increases had less impact 
than the initial introduction. The most 
common response of salon owners was to 
increase prices. The strongest impact of the 
NMW in terms of employment was on the 
costs and employment opportunities for 
young workers. Many employers were no 
longer willing to provide opportunities for 
those who commence their training above 
the age of 16 or 17. 
C. Faichnie  
Greater 
Manchester 
Low Pay 
Unit 
 
To study the 
impact of the 
minimum wage 
on young peo-
ple's pay and 
employment. 
 
Research was based on: analysis 
of Jobcentre and Career Services 
data on vacancies; and a short 
questionnaire to Career Services 
about their views and experience 
of the minimum wage. 
 
There was little evidence that employers 
were limiting jobs to 16 and 17 year olds to 
avoid paying the minimum wage. In gen-
eral, jobs that offered formal training of-
fered lower rates of pay than jobs which 
offered 'in-house' or 'on-the-job' training. 
The use of age-related pay rates in jobs 
advertised in Jobcentres was small, and 
concentrated in retail and hospitality occu-
pations. The experience of Careers Officers 
was that employers paid the adult minimum 
wage to younger age groups. The increase 
in the minimum wage to £4.10 did not lead 
employers to take advantage of the lower 
rates for younger ages. 
 
J. Forth 
and M. 
O'Mahony  
National 
Institute of 
Economic 
and Social 
Research 
 
To measure 
productivity and 
labour costs in 
low-paying 
sectors. 
 
The authors compiled sectoral 
measures of the levels of labour 
productivity and unit labour costs 
on an annual basis over the period 
1995-2000. These were used to 
describe changes in the levels of 
labour productivity and unit 
labour costs in seven low-paying 
sectors, and to compare with the 
trends in higher-paying sectors 
unaffected by the minimum wage. 
A statistical analysis of labour 
productivity growth was also 
conducted to assess more robustly 
whether labour productivity 
growth could be linked to the 
introduction of the NMW. 
During this period labour productivity rose 
in six out of seven low-paying sectors - the 
exception being in clothing and footwear. 
In three sectors -textiles, security and hair-
dressing -the average annual growth in 
labour productivity was higher in the period 
1998-2000 than in the previous three years. 
But the statistical analysis found no robust 
association between the wage bill impact of 
the minimum wage and rates of labour 
productivity growth across a wide range of 
sectors. There was no evidence of the 
NMW leading to a general increase in unit 
labour costs over this period. 
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D. Grim-
shaw and 
M. Carroll  
University 
of Man-
chester, 
Institute of 
Science and 
Technology 
 
To investigate 
the range of 
actions taken by 
small firms in 
response to the 
National Mini-
mum Wage. 
 
Interviews with the owner or 
managing director of 36 small 
firms drawn from the clothing and 
footwear, hospitality, residential 
care, retail, security and cleaning 
sectors. Firms were chosen from 
three geographical areas in the 
North West to reflect differences 
in labour market conditions. 
Follow-up interviews were held 
with a sample of employees at 
five of the case-study firms. 
 
Half the firms in the sample raised their pay 
to comply with the National Minimum 
Wage. Of those affected less than half 
restored pay differentials. The research 
reported little evidence of an adverse im-
pact of the NMW on employment, but a 
reduction in hours was reported by some 
firms, especially in the care sector. There 
were a number of constraints, internal and 
external to the firm, which impacted nega-
tively on firms' ability to adjust prices for a 
given product or service in response to the 
National Minimum Wage. The research 
reported little association between the form 
of training provision within the firm and its 
ability to pay. The NMW had generally 
acted as an instrument enabling positive 
change in the way firms adapted their prod-
uct market strategy and approach to manag-
ing employment. 
A. Man-
ning and 
R. Dickens  
Centre for 
Economic 
Perform-
ance, Lon-
don School 
of Econom-
ics and 
Political 
Science 
 
To investigate 
alternative 
approaches to 
estimating the 
impact of the 
NMW using the 
Labour Force 
Survey (LFS). 
Then to look at 
the impact of 
the NMW on 
the wage distri-
bution, poverty 
and the gender 
pay gap using 
these alterna-
tives. 
Analysis of the LFS data to inves-
tigate the robustness of estimates 
of the impact of the NMW to 
different methods of solving the 
‘missing data1 problem’ (i.e. the 
incomplete data on hourly pay 
rates). 
 
The hourly rate variable is a better measure 
of the hourly wage than the hourly pay 
variable (derived by dividing gross weekly 
earnings by usual weekly hours). Estimates 
of the percentage of employees affected by 
the NMW are sensitive to the precise 
method used to estimate hourly earnings. 
The results suggest that using the hourly 
rate measure of the hourly wage does make 
the minimum wage appear better targeted 
on poor working households. 
 
L. Miller, 
J. Hurst-
field and 
N. Stratton 
IPS Re-
search and 
Learning 
Society 
 
To examine the 
impact of the 
NMW on firms’ 
training deci-
sions. 
 
Short telephone interviews with 
121 mainly small firms in hospi-
tality, retail and hairdressing 
around Britain. Longer, face-to-
face interviews with 26 of these 
firms. 
 
Changes to training provision were gener-
ally in response to changing business cir-
cumstances rather than directly due to the 
NMW. Increases in training were usually to 
improve productivity or quality of perform-
ance. The older workers' Development Rate 
was not used, mainly because firms were 
unaware of it. Employers believed the 
Development Rate would be difficult to 
implement where training was largely on-
the-job, and this lower rate would tend to 
exacerbate recruitment difficulties. There 
was some evidence that the minimum wage 
had made some hairdressing firms reluctant 
to employ older trainees. 
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H. Rain-
bird, L. 
Holly and 
R. Leisten  
University 
College 
Northamp-
ton 
 
To examine the 
extent to which 
the NMW - 
particularly the 
youth and older 
workers' Devel-
opment Rates 
and the exemp-
tion for appren-
tices - has given 
employers 
incentives to 
invest in train-
ing. 
 
Interviews in 19 small and me-
dium-sized firms in three sectors 
in an economically depressed 
resort town and a relatively buoy-
ant county town. 
 
The NMW had had a more significant 
impact in the resort town than in the county 
town; all the county town firms surveyed 
paid above the NMW though some had 
reviewed employment practices and timing 
of wage increases. The main drivers for 
training were firms’ wider business strate-
gies in response to regulatory standards in 
social care, changes in the customer base in 
hospitality and maintaining retail markets, 
rather than the NMW. Firms’ use of train-
ing to recognised standards was also influ-
enced by the local training infrastructure. 
No firms used the older workers’ Develop-
ment Rate. 
M. Stewart  
University 
of Warwick 
 
To estimate the 
employment 
effects of the 
NMW. 
 
Using data from the LFS and 
New Earnings Survey (NES), the 
research drew on previous re-
search commissioned by the LPC, 
and extended it in several ways. 
First, it examined the impact of 
the 2000 and 2001 upratings to 
the minima. Second, it took ac-
count of individuals' position in 
the earnings distribution relative 
to the NMW (the ‘wage gap’) - 
that is, it distinguished between 
those whose wage needed to be 
increased a lot due to the NMW 
and those who only needed a 
small increase, and compared 
them with the control group 
above the minima. It also took 
account of factors specific to 
certain sectors and regions which 
might affect employment in dif-
ferent labour markets. 
 
The research found little evidence that the 
introduction of the NMW had an adverse 
impact on the probability of subsequent 
employment of those affected. The esti-
mates of the 2000 uprating were more 
mixed. There was some evidence of a nega-
tive effect, mainly for adult women, but it 
was sensitive to the choice of wage variable 
and estimation method and was significant 
only in one of the four specifications. There 
was evidence that the differential impact of 
the slowdown in employment growth 
(which may affect low-paid workers more 
than those higher up the earnings distribu-
tion) biased the estimates. Once this was 
controlled for the results were insignificant. 
Analysis of the impact of the 2001 uprating 
was restricted by the available data, but 
initial results largely supported the view 
that there was no adverse impact. 
 
M. Stewart  
University 
of Warwick 
 
To examine 
whether there 
has been a 
significant 
difference in the 
pattern of labour 
market transi-
tions since the 
introduction of 
the NMW. 
 
Labour market transition matrices 
were constructed from quarterly 
LFS data (March 1997 to Febru-
ary 2002). The paper examined 
differences in the transition prob-
abilities before, spanning and 
after the introduction of the 
NMW, and looked at the impact 
of age, gender and region on these 
differences. Three linear probabil-
ity models were constructed to 
examine the change in three 
particular transition probabilities 
before and after the NMW, con-
trolling for personal characteris-
Significant changes in the transition prob-
abilities fell into three groups. 
* Those entering employment from unem-
ployment were found to be doing so at 
higher wages post NMW, with the propor-
tion moving from unemployment into the 
bottom wage group falling, and the propor-
tion moving into the top wage group in-
creasing. The fall in the proportion moving 
to the bottom wage group from unemploy-
ment was found to be significant when 
modelled controlling for other factors. The 
fall was found to be most significant for 
women, for those aged below 35, and for 
those in London and the South East. 
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tics and other factors. 
 
* The probability of remaining in the bot-
tom wage group fell significantly post 
NMW, and transitions from the bottom real 
wage group to the next group increased 
significantly. The fall in the proportion 
remaining in the bottom group was found to 
be significant when other factors were 
taken into account. The changes were pre-
dominantly outside the South East, and of 
the three age groups examined, were more 
significant for the youngest and oldest age 
groups, and more significant for men than 
for women. 
* The proportion inactive and wanting to 
work rose significantly post NMW; the 
proportion moving from inactive and want-
ing to work, to inactive and not wanting to 
work, fell significantly. The increase in the 
proportion inactive and wanting to work 
was found to be significant. Controlling for 
other variables, this was found to be pri-
marily for those outside London and the 
rest of the South East, and for those over 
35. 
M. Stewart 
and J. 
Swaffield 
University 
of Warwick 
and Univer-
sity of York 
 
To identify 
whether the 
introduction of 
the NMW in 
April 1999 and 
its subsequent 
upratings have 
had a significant 
impact on the 
number of hours 
worked by low-
paid employees. 
 
The researchers used individual 
level longitudinal data from three 
national data sets (NES, LFS and 
British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) to estimate the impact of 
the NMW on the hours of work of 
employees whose wages had been 
raised to comply with NMW 
levels. The researchers estimated 
a model of the individual em-
ployee's change in paid working 
hours as a function of the individ-
ual's initial position in the wage 
distribution. They used a differ-
ence-in-difference estimation 
method to examine whether 
changes in working hours of 
employees whose wages were 
directly affected by the NMW 
were significantly different from 
those whose wages were not 
affected. 
 
NES and LFS data showed a significant 
negative impact on hours worked of adult 
males in the period following the introduc-
tion of the NMW (April 1999 up to Sep-
tember 2000), suggesting a lagged impact 
of the introduction of the NMW. No evi-
dence was found of an impact of either the 
October 2000 or the October 2001 uprating 
on adult males. These data showed no 
impact of the introduction, or of subsequent 
upratings, of the NMW on hours worked of 
young people. 
Results from the NES found a slight indica-
tion of a negative initial impact on hours 
worked of adult females, but only when the 
control group used was varied. No signifi-
cant impact was found using the LFS. 
BHPS data indicated a positive and signifi-
cant impact on hours worked of adult fe-
males which was robust to changes in the 
control groups. However, as the BHPS 
samples were so much smaller than those 
from the NES and LFS this evidence was 
argued to be less persuasive. 
Source: LPC4, 2003, Table A2.1 
